# Cybersecurity, Energy, and Intelligence Tradeoffs in IoT

Invited Lecture, Sponsored by TEQIP-III, Govt. of India Indian Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University (IIT-BHU) 25-31 December 2020

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### **The Big Picture**



### **Population Trend – Urban Migration**

"India is to be found not in its few cities, but in its 700,000 villages." - Mahatma Gandhi

- 2025: 60% of world population will be urban
- 2050: 70% of world population will be urban



Source: http://www.urbangateway.org



### **Issues Challenging City Sustainability**





### **Energy Crisis**





### **Smart City Technology - As a Solution**

- Smart Cities: For effective management of limited resource to serve largest possible population to improve:
  - Livability
  - Workability
  - Sustainability






### Year 2050: 70% of world population will be urban

Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.



### **Smart Cities - History**





11

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### **Smart Cities Vs Smart Villages**

City - An inhabited place of greater size, population, or importance than a town or village

-- Merriam-Webster

Smart City: A city "connecting the physical infrastructure, the information-technology infrastructure, the social infrastructure, and the business infrastructure to leverage the collective intelligence of the city".


Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.

Smart Village: A village that uses information and communication technologies (ICT) for advancing economic and social development to make villages sustainable.

Source: S. K. Ram, B. B. Das, K. K. Mahapatra, S. P. Mohanty, and U. Choppali, "Energy Perspectives in IoT Driven Smart Villages and Smart Cities", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE)*, Vol. XX, No. YY, ZZ 2021, DOI: 10.1109/MCE.2020.3023293.




### **Smart Cities - 3 Is**



Source: Mohanty ISC2 2019 Keynote








Source: Mohanty ICIT 2017 Keynote

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
# IoT $\rightarrow$ CPS $\rightarrow$ Smart Cities or Smart Villages



Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.




### **Smart Healthcare**






# Healthcare Cyber-Physical System (H-CPS)



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### **Smart Agriculture**



Source: http://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/precision-agriculture-almost-20-increase-income-possible-smart-farming

#### Smart Agriculture/Farming Market Worth \$18.21 Billion By 2025

Sources: http://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-smart-agriculture-farming-market

### Climate-Smart Agriculture

- **Objectives:**
- Increasing agricultural productivity
- Resilience to climate change
- Reducing greenhouse gas

http://www.fao.org


Internet-of-Agro-Things (IoAT)

Automatic Irrigation System




Source: Maurya 2017, CE Magazine July 2017





Source: V. Udutalapally, S. P. Mohanty, V. Pallagani, and V. Khandelwal, "sCrop: A Novel Device for Sustainable Automatic Disease Prediction, Crop Selection, and Irrigation in Internet-of-Agro-Things for Smart Agriculture", *IEEE Sensors Journal*, Vol. XX, No. YY, ZZ 2020, pp. Accepted on 14 Oct 2020, DOI: 10.1109/JSEN.2020.3032438.






Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.



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# **Transportation Cyber-Physical System (T-CPS)**



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30

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
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### **Challenges in IoT/CPS Design**






35





### **Massive Growth of Sensors/Things**





### **Security Challenges – Information**



#### Hacked: Linkedin, Tumbler, & Myspace

### Linked in tumblr. ::::myspace

Who did it: A hacker going by the name Peace. What was done: 500 million passwords were stolen.

**Details:** Peace had the following for sale on a Dark Web Store:

167 million Linkedin passwords
360 million Myspace passwords
68 million Tumbler passwords
100 million VK.com passwords
71 million Twitter passwords

**Personal Information** 




Credit Card/Unauthorized Shopping



# **Cybersecurity Challenges - System**



Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/3177209/security/why-the-ukraine-power-grid-attacks-should-raise-alarm.html




BRAKES Source: http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/01/technology/security/car-hack/



Source: http://politicalblindspot.com/u-s-drone-hacked-and-hijacked-with-ease/



### **Smart Healthcare - Security and Privacy Issue**





### **IoMT Security Issue is Real & Scary**

- Insulin pumps are vulnerable to hacking, FDA warns amid recall: <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/06/28/insulin-pumps-are-vulnerable-hacking-fda-warns-amid-recall/</u>
- Software vulnerabilities in some medical devices could leave them susceptible to hackers, FDA warns:

https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/health/fda-medical-devices-hackers-trnd/index.html

FDA Issues Recall For Medtronic mHealth Devices Over Hacking Concerns: <u>https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/fda-issues-recall-for-medtronic-mhealth-devices-over-hacking-concerns</u>



### Reliable Supply Chain: Food Supply Chain: Farm → Dinning




Source: A. M. Joshi, U. P. Shukla, and S. P. Mohanty, "Smart Healthcare for Diabetes: A COVID-19 Perspective", arXiv Quantitative Biology, arXiv:2008.11153, August 2020, 18-pages.



# Smart Car – Modification of Input Signal of Control Can be Dangerous




- Typically vehicles are controlled by human drivers
- > Designing an Autonomous Vehicle (AV) requires decision chains.
- >AV actuators controlled by algorithms.
- Decision chain involves sensor data, perception, planning and actuation.
- Perception transforms sensory data to useful information.
- Planning involves decision making.





### **Smart Grid - Vulnerability**




Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components of smart grid is cyber vulnerable.

Data, Application/System Software, Firmware of Embedded System are the loop holes for security/privacy.

Network/Communication Components Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) Energy Storage Systems (ESS) Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) Smart Meters

Source: Y. Mo et al., "Cyber-Physical Security of a Smart Grid Infrastructure", Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 195-209, Jan. 2012.








### **RFID Security - Attacks**





### **NFC Security - Attacks**




Source: https://www.slideshare.net/cgvwzq/on-relaying-nfc-payment-transactions-using-android-devices



61

### Firmware Reverse Engineering – Security Threat for Embedded System



### Extract, modify, or reprogram code




OS exploitation, Device jailbreaking

Source: http://jcjc-dev.com/

Source: http://grandideastudio.com/wp-content/uploads/current\_state\_of\_hh\_slides.pdf



### **Attacks on Embedded Systems' Memory**




Source: S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomathisankaran, and S. P. Mohanty, "TSV: A Novel Energy Efficient Memory Integrity Verification Scheme for Embedded Systems", *Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture*, Vol. 59, No. 7, Aug 2013, pp. 400-411.




### Trojans can Provide Backdoor Entry to Adversary



Provide backdoor to adversary. Chip fails during critical needs.




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Breaking Encryption is not a matter of Years, but a matter of Hours.

Source: Parameswaran Keynote iNIS-2017








### **Privacy Challenge – Personal Data**






Source: http://ciphercloud.com/three-ways-pursuecloud-data-privacy-medical-records/



Source: http://blog.veriphyr.com/2012/06/electronic-medicalrecords-security-and.html



### **Privacy Challenge – System, Location**




Source: http://www.computerworld.com/article/3005436/cybercrime-hacking/black-hat-europe-it-s-easy-and-costs-only-60-to-hack-self-driving-car-sensors.html



# Bigdata → Intelligence – Deep Learning is the Key


- "DL at the Edge" overlaps all of these research areas.
- New Foundation Technologies, enhance data curation, improved AI, and Networks accuracy.



Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018



#### **ML Modeling Issues**




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EST, 1890


# Deep Neural Network (DNN) -Resource and Energy Costs



**Needs Significant:** 


- Computational Resource
- Computation Energy

#### **PREDICT:** Integrate trained models into applications.




Source: https://www.mathworks.com/campaigns/offers/mastering-machine-learning-with-matlab.html







#### **DNNs are not Always Smart**




#### DNNs can be fooled by certain "learned" (Adversarial) patterns ...

Source: A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski and J. Clune, "Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images," in Proc. IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2015, pp. 427-436.



80

# Al Security - Trojans in Artificial Intelligence (TrojAl)






Adversaries can insert **Trojans** into Als, leaving a trigger for bad behavior that they can activate during the Al's operations

Source: https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=1150&Itemid=448




## Consumer Electronics Demand More and More Energy



Smart Electronic Systems Laboratory (SESL)


88

#### **Energy Consumption**





# **Energy Storage - High Capacity and Safer Needed**




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#### **Energy Optimization of CE System is difficult due to a Variety of Components**





## **Cybrsecurity Solution for IoT/CPS**






100

#### **IoT Security - Attacks and Countermeasures**


		]	Threat	Against	]	Countermeasures
Edge nodes	Computing nodes		Hardware Trojans	All		Side-channel signal analysis
			Side-channel attacks	C,AU,NR,P		Trojan activation methods
			Denial of Service (DoS)	A,AC,AU,NR,P		Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
			Physical attacks	All		Securing firmware update
			Node replication attacks	All		Circuit/design modification
	RFID tags		Camouflage	All		-
			Corrupted node	All		Kill/sleep command
			Tracking	P, NR		Isolation
			Inventorying	P, NR		Blocking
			Tag cloning	All		Anonymous tag
			Counterfeiting	All		Distance estimation
Communication		Eavesdropping	C,NR,P		Personal firewall	
			Injecting fraudulent packets	P,I,AU,TW,NR		Cryptographic schemes
			Routing attacks	C,I,AC,NR,P		Reliable routing
			Unauthorized conversation	All	$\leq$ $\backslash \backslash$	De-patterning and
			Malicious injection	All		Decentralization
			Integrity attacks against	C,I		Role-based authorization
Edge computing			learning Non-standard frameworks	All		Information Flooding
			and inadequate testing	All		Pre-testing
			Insufficient/Inessential	C,AC,NR,P		Outlier detection
			logging			
C- Confidentiality, I – Integrity, A - Availability, AC – Accountability, AU – Source: A. Mosenia, and Niraj K. Jha. "A Comprehensive Study of Security of Internet-of-Things", <i>IEEE Transactions</i>						
Auditability, TW – Trustworthiness, NR - Non-repudiation, P - Privacy on Emerging Topics in Computing, 5(4), 2016, pp. 586-602.						





102


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Source: S. Ghosh, J. Goswami, A. Majumder, A. Kumar, **S. P. Mohanty**, and B. K. Bhattacharyya, "Swing-Pay: One Card Meets All User Payment and Identity Needs", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE)*, Volume 6, Issue 1, January 2017, pp. 82--93.




#### **RFID Cybersecurity - Solutions**






#### **Smart Healthcare Security**





#### **Blockchain in Smart Healthcare**




Source: C. Esposito, A. De Santis, G. Tortora, H. Chang and K. R. Choo, "Blockchain: A Panacea for Healthcare Cloud-Based Data Security and Privacy?," IEEE Cloud Computing, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 31-37, Jan./Feb. 2018.

The block is inserted in the chain and linked with the previous blocks.



### Autonomous Car Security – Collision Avoidance

- Attack: Feeding of malicious sensor measurements to the control and the collision avoidance module. Such an attack on a position sensor can result in collisions between the vehicles.
- Solutions: "Dynamic Watermarking" of signals to detect and stop such attacks on cyber-physical systems.
   Idea: Superimpose each actuator *i* a random signal *e<sub>i</sub>[t]* (watermark) on control policy-specified input.





109

### **Nonvolatile Memory Security and Protection**



Source: http://datalocker.com

Nonvolatile / Harddrive Storage


Hardware-based encryption of data secured/protected by strong password/PIN authentication.

Software-based encryption to secure systems and partitions of hard drive.

#### Some performance penalty due to increase in latency!




### **Embedded Memory Security**



Source: S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomathisankaran, and S. P. Mohanty, "MEM-DnP: A Novel Energy Efficient Approach for Memory Integrity Detection and Protection in Embedded Systems", *Springer Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing Journal (CSSP)*, Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2013, pp. 2581--2604.



#### **Firmware Security - Solution**



Source: https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/white-paper/AUTOSECURITYWP.pdf




### **Energy Solutions for IoT/CPS**






114

# **Energy Consumption Challenge in IoT**










## **Smart Energy – Smart Consumption**





117

# Sustainable IoT - Low-Power Sensors and Efficient Routing



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data collector

- IoT sensors near the data collector drain energy faster than other nodes.
- Solution Idea Mobile sink in which the network is balanced with node energy consumption.
- Solution Need: New data routing to forward data towards base station using mobile data collector, in which two data collectors follow a predefined path.

Source: S. S. Roy, D. Puthal, S. Sharma, S. P. Mohanty, and A. Y. Zomaya, "Building a Sustainable Internet of Things", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 2, March 2018, pp. 42--49.

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
source

normal node




forwarding node

# Energy Consumption of Sensors, Components, and Systems












### **Energy Reduction in CE Hardware**





#### **Battery-Less IoT**

Battery less operations can lead to reduction of size and weight of the edge devices.

#### **Go Battery-Less**




Source: http://newscenter.ti.com/2015-02-25-TI-makesbattery-less-loT-connectivity-possible-with-the-industrysfirst-multi-standard-wireless-microcontroller-platform



Batter-Less SoC


Source: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/529206/a-batteryless-sensor-chip-for-the-internet-of-things/



Source: http://rlpvlsi.ece.virginia.edu/node/368




#### Energy Storage - High Capacity and Efficiency Needed






124

#### **Supercapacitor based Power for CE**



Source: A. S. Sengupta, S. Satpathy, S. P. Mohanty, D. Baral, and B. K. Bhattacharyya, "Supercapacitors Outperform Conventional Batteries", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 7, Issue 5, September 2018, pp. 50--53.





### **Energy Management Solutions Don't Target Cybersecurity and AI Problems**



127


#### **AI Solutions for IoT/CPS**





128


#### Smart Sensors - General-Purpose/ Synthetic Sensors



Source: Laput 2017, http://www.gierad.com/projects/supersensor/




#### **Systems – End Devices**





130

## **Smart Healthcare - Activity Monitoring**





# **Smart Healthcare – Diet Monitoring**

User takes a picture of the Nutrition Automated Food intake User scans the barcode of the product Facts using Smart Phone Monitoring and Diet Using Open Application Program Use Optical Character Recognition Interface (API)'s and Database **Prediction System** (OCR) to convert images to text approach, the nutrition facts are acquired from Central database Smart plate Nutrition facts obtained through OCR Nutrient facts obtained through API's Data acquisition using mobile ML based Future Meal Prediction Weight and Time information obtained through Sensing Board Smart-Log Box-1 Box-2 Box-3 Calculate Nutrient Value of the meal Feedback to the user Box-4 Box-5 Save the Nutrient value, Weight, Time of Box-8 Box-7 Box-9 each meal for future predictions Food Product USDA National Nutrient Database  $\odot$ Piezo-sensor used for nutrient values of 8791 items. Data logged into Cloud Camera to acquire Nutrient values 8172 user instances were considered **Research Works Food Recognition Method** Efficiency (%) **This Work** Mapping nutrition facts to a database 98.4 Source: P. Sundaravadivel, K. Kesavan, L. Kesavan, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Smart-Log: A Deep-Learning based Automated Nutrition Monitoring System in the IoT", IEEE Trans. on Consumer Electronics, Vol 64, No 3, Aug 2018, pp. 390-398, 

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
132

**Smart Electronic Systems** 

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
#### Smart Healthcare - Stress Monitoring & Control



Source: L. Rachakonda, P. Sundaravadivel, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and M. Ganapathiraju, "A Smart Sensor in the IoMT for Stress Level Detection", in Proc. 4th IEEE International Symposium on Smart Electronic Systems (iSES), 2018, pp. 141--145.



## **Smart Healthcare – Smart-Pillow**




Source: Monanty ISES 2018: "Smart-Pillow: An IoT based Device for Stress Detection Considering Sleeping Habits", in *Proc. of 4th IEEE International Symposium on Smart Electronic Systems (iSES)* 2018.



134


# Smart-Yoga Pillow (SaYoPillow) - Sleeping Pattern



Source: L. Rachakonda, A. K. Bapatla, **S. P. Mohanty**, and E. Kougianos, "SaYoPillow: Blockchain-Integrated Privacy-Assured IoMT Framework for Stress Management Considering Sleeping Habit", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Vol. XX, No. YY, ZZ 2021, pp. Accepted on 07 Dec 2020, DOI: 10.1109/TCE.2020.3043683.



# **Smart Healthcare – iLog**




#### iLog-Fully Automated Detection System with 98% accuracy.

Source: L. Rachakonda, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "iLog: An Intelligent Device for Automatic Food Intake Monitoring and Stress Detection in the IoMT", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Vol. 66, No. 2, May 2020, pp. 115--124.



137


# iMirror: Our Smart Mirror for Stress Detection from Facial Features




Source: L. Rachakonda, P. Rajkumar, **S. P. Mohanty**, and E. Kougianos, "iMirror: A Smart Mirror for Stress Detection in the IoMT Framework for Advancements in Smart Cities", *Proceedings of the 6th IEEE Smart Cities Conference (ISC2)*, 2020.



#### **iFeliz: Our Framework for Automatic Stress Control**






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# Good-Eye: Our Multimodal Sensor System for Elderly Fall Prediction and Detection




Good-Eye: Fall detection and prediction Accuracy - 95%.

Source: L. Rachakonda, A. Sharma, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Good-Eye: A Combined Computer-Vision and Physiological-Sensor based Device for Full-Proof Prediction and Detection of Fall of Adults", in *Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP International Internet of Things (IoT) Conference (IFIP-IoT)*, 2019, pp. 273--288.




### Smart Healthcare - Seizure Detection & Control



Source: M. A. Sayeed, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and H. Zaveri, "Neuro-Detect: A Machine Learning Based Fast and Accurate Seizure Detection System in the IoMT", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume XX, Issue YY, ZZ 2019, pp. Accepted on 16 May 2019, DOI: 10.1109/TCE.2019.2917895.



# Smart Healthcare – Brain as a Spatial Map → Kriging Methods




Spatial modeling or Variography - Correlation Function is "Variogram"

Source: http://desktop.arcgis.com/en/arcmap/10.3/tools/3d-analyst-toolbox/how-kriging-works.htm

Spatial autocorrelation principle - things that are closer are more alike than things farther

Source: I. L. Olokodana, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Ordinary-Kriging Based Real-Time Seizure Detection in an Edge Computing Paradigm", in *Proceedings of the 38th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE)*, 2020, Accepted.





Computing Paradigm", in Proceedings of the 38th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE), 2020, Accepted.




# Al Solutions Don't Target Energy Issues and Cybersecurity Problems



# Our Hierarchical ML to Reduce Training Time - Bootstrapping


- A Bootstrap helps in pulling on a boot.
- It means solving a problem without external resources.



Source: http://www.lemen.com/dictionary-b.html#bootstrap



# **Our Bootstrapped Kriging**




Source: I. L. Olokodana, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Hierarchical Model for Real-Time Seizure Detection from EEG Signals", in *Proceedings of the 6th IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)*, 2020





149

# **Our Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Model**




Source: I. L. Olokodana, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Hierarchical Model for Real-Time Seizure Detection from EEG Signals", in *Proceedings of the 6th IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)*, 2020.



150

## **Experimental Results**




Proposed model trains in 75% less time and 30 times reduced training epoch size than the ordinary DNN, as well as a 2.5% improvement in testing accuracy.

Source: I. L. Olokodana, **S. P. Mohanty**, and E. Kougianos, "Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Hierarchical Model for Real-Time Seizure Detection from EEG Signals", in *Proceedings of the 6th IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)*, 2020.




# Our Distributed Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Model



Source: I. L. Olokodana, **S. P. Mohanty**, and E. Kougianos, "Distributed Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Model for Fast, Accurate Seizure Detection from EEG Signals", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020, pp. 264--269.



#### **Experimental Results: Dataset A**




Detection from EEG Signals", Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI), 2020, pp. 264--269.



#### **Experimental Results: Dataset A**

Models	Detection Latency
DNN	0.80s
Ordinary Kriging	0.86s
Krig-DNN	0.80s
Dist-Krig-DNN	0.80s



Source: I. L. Olokodana, **S. P. Mohanty**, and E. Kougianos, "Distributed Kriging-Bootstrapped DNN Model for Fast, Accurate Seizure Detection from EEG Signals", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020, pp. 264--269.



# Drawbacks of Existing Security Solutions





157

# **CPS Security – Selected Solutions**

Analysis of selected approaches to security and privacy issues in CE.				
Category	Current Approaches	Advantages	Disadvantages	
Confidentiality	Symmetric key cryptography	Low computation overhead	Key distribution problem	
	Asymmetric key cryptography	Good for key distribution	High computation overhead	
Integrity	Message authentication codes	Verification of message contents	Additional computation overhead	
Availability	Signature-based authentication	Avoids unnecessary signature computations	Requires additional infrastructure and rekeying scheme	
Authentication	Physically unclonable functions (PUFs)	High speed	Additional implementation challenges	
	Message authentication codes	Verification of sender	Computation overhead	
Nonrepudiation	Digital signatures	Link message to sender	Difficult in pseudonymous systems	
	Pseudonym	Disguise true identity	Vulnerable to pattern analysis	
Identity privacy	Attribute-based credentials	Restrict access to information based on shared secrets	Require shared secrets with all desired services	
Information privacy	Differential privacy	Limit privacy exposure of any single data record	True user-level privacy still chal- lenging	
	Public-key cryptography	Integratable with hardware	Computationally intensive	
Location privacy	Location cloaking	Personalized privacy	Requires additional infrastructure	
Usage privacy	Differential privacy	Limit privacy exposure of any single data record	Recurrent/time-series data challenging to keep private	

Source: D. A. Hahn, A. Munir, and S. P. Mohanty, "Security and Privacy Issues in Contemporary Consumer Electronics", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2019, pp. 95--99.



# IT Security Solutions Can't be Directly Extended to IoT/CPS Security

#### **IT Security**

- IT infrastructure may be well protected rooms
- Limited variety of IT network devices
- Millions of IT devices
- Significant computational power to run heavy-duty security solutions
- IT security breach can be costly


#### IoT Security

- IoT may be deployed in open hostile environments
- Significantly large variety of IoT devices
- Billions of IoT devices
- May not have computational power to run security solutions
- IoT security breach (e.g. in a IoMT device like pacemaker, insulin pump) can be life threatening

Maintaining of Security of Consumer Electronics, Electronic Systems, IoT, CPS, etc. needs Energy and affects performance.


159

# Security Measures in Healthcare Cyber-Physical Systems is Hard



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
162



Source: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white\_papers/public-building-security-into-cars-20150805.pdf




## **UAV Security -** Energy & Latency Constrained



Source: http://politicalblindspot.com/u-s-drone-hacked-and-hijacked-with-ease/



# **Smart Grid Security Constraints**



Conference (NPSC), 2016, pp. 1-6.



# **Blockchain has Many Challenges**



Source: D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, July 2018, pp. 06--14.






# **Blockchain Energy Need is Huge**



Energy for mining of 1 bitcoin



Energy consumption 2 years of a US household





# **Blockchain has Security Challenges**

Selected attacks on the blockchain and defences				
Attacks	Descriptions	Defence		
Double spending	Many payments are made with a body of funds	Complexity of mining process		
Record hacking	Blocks are modified, and fraudulent transactions are inserted	Distributed consensus		
51% attack	A miner with more than half of the network's computational power dominates the verification process			
Identity theft	An entity's private key is stolen	Reputation of the blockchain on identities		
System hacking	The software systems that implement a blockchain are compromised	Advanced intrusion detection systems		

Source: N. Kolokotronis, K. Limniotis, S. Shiaeles, and R. Griffiths, "Secured by Blockchain: Safeguarding Internet of Things Devices," *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 28–34, May 2019.



# **Blockchain has Serious Privacy Issue**

	Bitcoin	Dash	Monero	Verge	PIVX	Zcash
Origin	-	Bitcoin	Bytecoin	Bitcoin	Dash	Bitcoin
Release	January	January	April	October	February	October
	2009	2014	2014	2014	2016	2016
Consensus Algorithm	PoW	PoW	PoW	PoW	PoS	PoW
Hardware Mineable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Block Time	600 sec.	150 sec.	120 sec.	30 sec.	60 sec.	150 sec.
Rich List	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Master Node	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Sender Address Hidden	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Receiver Address Hidden	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sent Amount Hidden	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
IP Addresses Hidden	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Privacy	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Untraceability	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Fungibility	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Source: J. Lee, "Rise of Anonymous Cryptocurrencies: Brief Introduction", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 20-25, 1 Sept. 2019.



## **Smart Contracts - Vulnerabilities**

Vulnerability	Cause	Level
Call to unknown	The called function does not exist	Contract's source code
Out-of-gas send	Fallback of the callee is executed	Contract's source code
Exception disorder	Exception handling irregularity	Contract's source code
Type casts	Contract execution type-check error	Contract's source code
Reentrance flaw	Function reentered before exit	Contract's source code
Field disclosure	Private value published by miner	Contract's source code
Immutable bug	Contract altering after deployment	Ethereum virtual machine bytecode
Ether lost	Ether sent to orphan address	Ethereum virtual machine bytecode
Unpredicted state	Contract state change before call	Blockchain Mechanism
Randomness bug	Seed biased by malicious miner	Blockchain mechanism
Time-stamp failure	Malicious miner alters time stamp	Blockchain mechanism

Source: N. Kolokotronis, K. Limniotis, S. Shiaeles, and R. Griffiths, "Secured by Blockchain: Safeguarding Internet of Things Devices," *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 28–34, May 2019.



# Cybersecurity Attacks - Software and Hardware Based

via

Software Based

- Software attacks communication channels
- Typically from remote
- More frequent
- Selected Software based:
  - Denial-of-Service (DoS)
  - Routing Attacks
  - Malicious Injection
  - Injection of fraudulent packets
  - Snooping attack of memory
  - Spoofing attack of memory and IP address
  - Password-based attacks

Hardware Based



- Hardware or physical attacks
- Maybe local
- More difficult to prevent
- Selected Hardware based:
  - Hardware backdoors (e.g. Trojan)
  - Inducing faults
  - Electronic system tampering/ jailbreaking
  - Eavesdropping for protected memory
  - Side channel attack
  - Hardware counterfeiting

Source: Mohanty ICCE Panel 2018



# Cybersecurity Solutions - Software Vs Hardware Based

Software Based



- Introduces latency in operation
- Flexible Easy to use, upgrade and update
- Wider-Use Use for all devices in an organization
- Higher recurring operational cost
- Tasks of encryption easy compared to hardware – substitution tables
- Needs general purpose processor
- Can't stop hardware reverse engineering

#### Hardware Based

- High-Speed operation
- Energy-Efficient operation
- Low-cost using ASIC and FPGA
- Tasks of encryption easy compared to software – bit permutation
- Easy integration in CE systems
- Possible security at source-end like sensors, better suitable for IoT
- Susceptible to side-channel attacks
- Can't stop software reverse engineering

Source: Mohanty ICCE Panel 2018



177

# Cybersecurity Solutions Don't Target Energy Issues and AI Problems




# Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS) or Secure-by-Design (SbD)





180





# Privacy by Design (PbD) → General Data Protection Regulation (GPDR)


1995 2018 Privacy by Design (PbD) **General Data Protection** Regulation (GDPR) Treat privacy concerns as ✤ GDPR makes Privacy by design requirements when Design (PbD) a legal developing technology, requirement rather than trying to retrofit privacy controls Security by Design aka after it is built

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184

Secure by Design (SbD)

### Security by Design (SbD) and/or Privacy by Design (PbD)



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185

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# Security by Design (SbD) and/or Privacy by Design (PbD)




Source: https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource\_center/Privacy%20by%20Design%20-%207%20Foundational%20Principles.pdf



186

#### **CEI Tradeoffs for Smart Electronic Systems**





### Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS)

- Hardware-Assisted Security: Security provided by hardware for:
  - (1) information being processed,
  - (2) hardware itself,
  - (3) overall system

- Privacy by Design (PbD)
- Security/Secure by Design (SbD)
- Additional hardware components used for security.
- Hardware design modification is performed.
- System design modification is performed.

RF Hardware Security Digital Hardware Security – Side Channel

Hardware Trojan Protection Information Security, Privacy, Protection

IR Hardware Security Me

Memory Protection Digital Core IP Protection

Source: Mohanty ICCE 2018 Panel




### **Secure SoC Design : Two Modes**

- Addition of security and AI features in SoC:
  - Algorithms
  - Protocols
  - Architectures
  - Accelerators / Engines Cybersecurity and AI Instructions
- Consideration of security as a dimension in the design flow:
  - New design methodology
  - Design automation or computer aided design (CAD) tools for fast design space exploration.



# **Secure Digital Camera (SDC) – My Invention**




Include additional/alternative hardware/software components and uses DVFS like technology for energy and performance optimization.

Security and/or Privacy by Design (SbD and/or PbD)

Source: S. P. Mohanty, "A Secure Digital Camera Architecture for Integrated Real-Time Digital Rights Management", *Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture (JSA)*, Volume 55, Issues 10-12, October-December 2009, pp. 468-480.




#### We Introduced First Ever Secure Better Portable Graphics (SBPG) Architecture






# PMsec: Our Secure by Design Approach for Robust Security in Healthcare CPS



Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.




### **IoMT Security – Our Proposed PMsec**



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### **IoMT Security – Our Proposed PMsec**




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#### **IoMT Security – Our Proposed PMsec**




Proposed Approach Characteristics	Value (in a FPGA / Raspberry Pi platform)
Time to Generate the Key at Server	800 ms
Time to Generate the Key at IoMT Device	800 ms
Time to Authenticate the Device	1.2 sec - 1.5 sec

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics*, Vol 65, No 3, Aug 2019, pp. 388--397.




#### **Blockchain Challenges - Energy**



Source: D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, July 2018, pp. 06--14.



# IoT-Friendly Blockchain – Our Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) based Blockchain






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


Smart Electronic

Laboratory (SE


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#### Our PoAh-Chain: Proposed New Block Structure




Simultaneous Device and DataSecurity in the Internet of Everything(IoE)", arXiv Computer Science, arXiv:1909.06496, Sep 2019, 37-pages.












#### Our PoAh is 200X Faster than PoW While Consuming a Very Minimal Energy


Consensus Algorithm	Blockchain Type	Prone To Attacks	Power Consumption	Time for Consensus
Proof-of-Work (PoW)	Public	Sybil, 51%	538 KWh	10 min
Proof-of-Stake (PoS)	Public	Sybil, Dos	5.5 KWh	
Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)	Private	Not Known	3.5 W	3 sec




Resource: D. Puthal, S. P. Mohanty, P. Nanda, "E." Kougianos, and G. Das, "Proof-of-Authentication for Scalable Blockchain in Resource-Constrained Distributed Systems", in *Proc. 37th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE)*, 2019.



#### We Proposed World's First Hardware-Integrated Blockchain (PUFchain) that is Scalable, Energy-Efficient, and Fast




Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and Data Security in Internet of Everything (IoE)", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE), Vol. 9, No. 2, March 2020, pp. 8-16.






#### **PUFchain:** Our Hardware-Assisted Scalable Blockchain




Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and Data Security in Internet of Everything (IoE)", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE), Vol. 9, No. 2, March 2020, pp. 8-16.






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#### **Our Proof-of-PUF-Enabled-Authentication (PoP)**




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#### PUFchain: Proposed New Block Structure






#### **PUFchain: Device Enrollment Steps**




Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and Data Security in Internet of Everything (IoE)", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE)*, Vol. 9, No. 2, March 2020, pp. in Press.







#### **Our PoP is 1000X Faster than PoW**




PoW - 10	PoAh – 950ms	PoP - 192ms in
min in cloud	in Raspberry Pi	Raspberry Pi
High Power	3 W Power	5 W Power

✓ PoP is 1,000X faster than PoW✓ PoP is 5X faster than PoAh



#### Our Multi-Chain Technology to Enhance Blockchain Scalability



Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020, pp. 446--451.




#### A Perspective of BC, Tangle Vs Our Multichain

Features/Technology	Blockchain (Bitcoin)	Proof of Authentication	Tangle	HashGraph	McPoRA (current Paper)
Linked Lists	<ul> <li>One linked list of blocks.</li> <li>Block of transactions.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>One linked list of blocks.</li> <li>Block of transactions.</li> </ul>	<ul><li>DAG linked list.</li><li>One transaction.</li></ul>	<ul> <li>DAG linked List.</li> <li>Container of transactions hash</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>DAG linked List.</li> <li>Block of transactions.</li> <li>Reduced block.</li> </ul>
Validation	Mining	Authentication	Mining	Virtual Voting (witness)	Authentication
Type of validation	Miners	Trusted Nodes	Transactions	Containers	All Nodes
Ledger Requirement	Full ledger required	Full ledger required	Portion based on longest and shortest paths.	Full ledger required	Portion based on authenticators' number
Cryptography	Digital Signatures	Digital Signatures	Quantum key signature	Digital Signatures	Digital Signatures
Hash function	SHA 256	SHA 256	KECCAK-384	SHA 384	SCRYPT
Consensus	Proof of Work	Cryptographic Authentication	Proof of Work	aBFT	Predefined UID
Numeric System	Binary	Binary	Trinity	Binary	Binary
Involved Algorithms	HashCash	No	<ul><li>Selection Algorithm</li><li>HashCash</li></ul>	No	BFP
Decentralization	Partially	Partially	Fully	Fully	Fully
Appending Requirements	Longest chain	One chain	Selection Algorithm	Full Randomness	Filtration Process
Energy Requirements	High	Low	High	Medium	Low
Node Requirements	High Resources Node	Limited Resources Node	High Resources Node	High Resources Node	Limited Resources Node
Design Purpose	Cryptocurrency	IoT applications	IoT/Cryptocurrency	Cryptocurrency	IoT/CPS applications

Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020.




#### **McPoRA based MultiChain -- Components**



Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020, pp. 446—451.



#### **Block Structure in McPoRA**




Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020



#### **McPoRA – Experimental Results**

Time (ms)	Authentication (ms)	Reduction (ms)
Minimum	1.51	252.6
Maximum	35.14	1354.6
Average	3.97	772.53




Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020, pp. 446—451.



223


# Hardware Security Primitives – TPM, HSM, TrustZone, and PUF






### **Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) - Principle**

- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are primitives for security.
- PUFs are easy to build and impossible to duplicate.
- The input and output are called a Challenge Response Pair.



Source: S. Joshi, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Wanted to Know about PUFs", *IEEE Potentials Magazine*, Volume 36, Issue 6, November-December 2017, pp. 38--46.






Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Making Use of Semiconductor Manufacturing Process Variations: FinFET-based Physical Unclonable Functions for Efficient Security Integration in the IoT", *Springer Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing Journal*, Volume 93, Issue 3, December 2017, pp. 429--441.





# Our SbD: Eternal-Thing: Combines Security and Energy Harvesting at the IoT-Edge




Source: S. K. Ram, S. R. Sahoo, Banee, B.Das, K. K. Mahapatra, and **S. P. Mohanty**, "Eternal-Thing: A Secure Aging-Aware Solar-Energy Harvester Thing for Sustainable IoT", *IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing*, Vol. XX, No. YY, ZZ 2021, pp. doi: 10.1109/TSUSC.2020.2987616.






## **Our SdD: Approach for DPA Resilience Hardware**



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### Where to Store and Process Data for ML Modeling, and where to Execute ML models?






242

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## **CPS – IoT-Edge Vs IoT-Cloud**



TinyML at End and/or Edge is key for smart villages.

Cloud Security/Intelligence

Clouc

➢Big Data


Internet

- Lots of Computational Resource
- Accurate Data Analytics
- ➤Latency in Network
- Energy overhead in Communications

Heavy-Duty ML is more suitable for smart cities



# **Our Smart-Yoga Pillow (SaYoPillow) with TinyML and Blockchain based Security**



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244

DOI:

2020.


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### Data Holds the Key for Intelligence in CPS



Source: Hongxu Yin, Ayten Ozge Akmandor, Arsalan Mosenia and Niraj K. Jha (2018), "Smart Healthcare", *Foundations and Trends® in Electronic Design Automation*, Vol. 12: No. 4, pp 401-466. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1000000054



### **Challenges of Data in CPS are Multifold**





### Fake Data and Fake Hardware – **Both are Equally Dangerous in CPS**

MEDICAL

S/N 172318

Authentic

ONDATA

Serial# \$300-6770

Authentic



Al can be fooled by fake data



A plug-in for car-engine computers Al can create fake data (Deepfake)



HONDATA

Serial# \$300-3541


Fake

MEDICAL

Fake




### Data and System Authentication and Ownership Protection – My 20 Years of Experiences



Source: S. P. Mohanty, A. Sengupta, P. Guturu, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Want to Know About Watermarking", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM),* Volume 6, Issue 3, July 2017, pp. 83--91.



## Our Design: First Ever Watermarking Chip for Source-End Visual Data Protection



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
253

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## Our Design: First Ever Watermarking Chip for Source-End Visual Data Integrity






254

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## **Our Design: First Ever Low-Power Watermarking Chip for Data Quality**




Chip Layout

Power Consumption: 0.3 mW, Operating Frequency: 70 MHz and 250 MHz at 1.5 V and 2.5 V

Source: S. P. Mohanty, N. Ranganathan, and K. Balakrishnan, "A Dual Voltage-Frequency VLSI Chip for Image Watermarking in DCT Domain", IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II (TCAS-II), Vol. 53, No. 5, May 2006, pp. 394-398.




# **Our Chip for Real-Time Video Watermarking**





# My Watermarking Research Inspired - TrustCAM



Source: https://pervasive.aau.at/BR/pubs/2010/Winkler\_AVSS2010.pdf


### Identifies sensitive image regions.

Protects privacy sensitive image regions.

> A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip provides a set of security primitives.




### My Watermarking Research Inspired – Secured Sensor



Source: G. R. Nelson, G. A. Jullien, O. Yadid-Pecht, "CMOS Image Sensor With Watermarking Capabilities", in *Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)*, 2005, pp. 5326–5329.




### **Secure Data Curation a Solution for Fake Data?**



Source: C. Yang, D. Puthal, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Big-Sensing-Data Curation for the Cloud is Coming", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 6, Issue 4, October 2017, pp. 48--56.



# **TinyML - Key for Smart Cities and Smart Villages**




Needs Significant:

Computational Resource

Computation Energy

Solution: Reduce Training Time and/or Computational Resource

### **PREDICT:** Integrate trained models into applications.




Source: https://www.mathworks.com/campaigns/offers/mastering-machine-learning-with-matlab.html



Smart Electronic Laboratory (SE UNT

# **Collaborative Edge Computing is Cost Effective Sustainable Computing for Smart Villages**



Source: D. Puthal, M. S. Obaidat, P. Nanda, M. Prasad, S. P. Mohanty, and A. Y. Zomaya, "Secure and Sustainable Load Balancing of Edge Data Centers in Fog Computing", IEEE Communications Mag, Vol. 56, No 5, May 2018, pp. 60--65.



computing

### Conclusions





266

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### Conclusions

- Security and Privacy are important problems in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS).
- Various elements and components of CPS including Data, Devices, System Components, AI need security.
- Both software and hardware-based attacks and solutions are possible.
- Security in H-CPS, E-CPS, and T-CPS, etc. can have serious consequences.
- Existing security solutions have serious overheads and may not even run in the end-devices (e.g. a medical device) of CPS/IoT.
- Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS): Security provided by hardware for: (1) information being processed, (2) hardware itself, (3) overall system. HAS/SbD advocate features at early design phases, no-retrofitting.



### **Future Directions**

- Privacy and/or Security by Design (PbD or SbD) needs research.
- Security, Privacy, IP Protection of Information and System (in Cyber-Physical Systems or CPS) need more research.
- Security of systems (e.g. Smart Healthcare device/data, Smart Grid, UAV, Smart Cars) needs research.
- Sustainable Smart City and Smart Villages: need sustainable IoT/CPS





### JOIN IEEE Consumer Electronics Society



IEEE CESoc - We bring New Technologies to Life

Entertainment, Communications, Information, Home Automation, Health Care, Education, Convenience to name just a few focal points and growing each year

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The field of interest of the Consumer Electronics Society is engineering and research aspects of the theory, design, construction, manufacture or end use of mass market electronics, systems, software and services for consumers. The society sponsors multiple conferences annually including the International Conference on Consumer Electronics and the International Symposium on Consumer Electronics.

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Monthly Society newsletter (electronic), Bi-Monthly IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (electronic and print), Quarterly IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (electronic), Discounts on Conference Registration, Reduced Prices on Affiliated Journals, IEEE Consumer Electronics Society Digital Library (electronic) and IEEE Consumer Electronics Society Resource Center (electronic).

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> Start your CESoc and IEEE membership immediately: Join online www.ieee.org/join and select IEEE Consumer Electronics Society (costs vary by country of residence -see website)



The IEEE Consumer Electronics Society (CESoc) will change the society's name to the IEEE Consumer Technology Society (CTSoc) starting from August 2020



12/25/2020

### **IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine**

EEE CONS The IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE) is the flagship award-winning magazine of the Consumer Technology Society (CTSoc) of IEEE. MCE is published bimonthly basis and features a range of topical content on state-of-art consumer electronics systems, services and devices, and associated technologies.

## **Jazine Flyer**

The MCE won an Apex Grand Award for excellence in writing in 2013. The MCE is the winner in the Regional 2016 STC Technical Communication Awards - Award of Excellence! The MCE is indexed in Clarivate Analytics (formerly IP Science of Thomson Reuters). The 2019 impact factor of MCE is 4.016.

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### Aim and Scope

- Consumer electronics magazine covers the areas or topics that are related to "consumer electronics".
- Articles should be broadly scoped typically review and tutorial articles are well fit for a magazine flavor.
- Technical articles may be suitable but these should be of general interest to an engineering audience and of broader scope than archival technical papers.
- Topics of interest to consumer electronics: Video technology. Audio technology, White goods, Home care products, Mobile communications, Gaming, Air care products, Home medical devices, Fitness devices, Home automation and networking devices, Consumer solar technology, Home theater, Digital imaging, . Arsign Munir, Konsos Stote University In-vehicle technology, Wireless technology, Cable and satellite technology, Home security, Domestic lighting, Human interface, Artificial intelligence, Home computing, Video Technology, Consumer storage technology. Studies or opinion pieces on the societal impacts of consumer electronics are also welcome.

### Have questions on submissions or ideas for special issues, contact EiC at: saraju.mohanty@unt.edu

### Submission Instructions

Submission should follow IEEE standard template and should consist of the following:

- I. A manuscript of maximum 6-page length: A pdf of the complete "Hyoungshick Kim, Sungkyunkwon University manuscript layout with figures, tables placed within the text. Extra pages (beyond allowed 6 pages) can be purchased.
- II.Source files: Text should be provided separately from photos and graphics and may be in Word or LaTeX format.
- High resolution original photos and graphics are required for the final submission.
- The graphics may be provided in a PowerPoint slide deck, with -Pallab Chatteriee, Media & Entertainment Technologies one figure/graphic per slide.
- An IEEE copyright form will be required. The manuscripts need "Dhruva Ghai, Oriental University to be submitted online at the URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cemag

http://cesoc.ieee.org/publications/ ce-magazine.html

More Information at:

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- Transactions on Consumer Electronics covers the areas or topics that are related to "consumer electronics".
- Topics of interest to consumer electronics among others are: Video technology, Audio technology, Home care products, Mobile communications, Gaming, Air care products, Home medical devices, Fitness devices, Home automation and networking devices, Consumer solar technology, Home theater, Digital imaging, In-vehicle technology, Wireless technology, Home security, Domestic lighting, Human interface, Artificial intelligence, Home computing, Video Technology, Consumer storage technology.

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