Security by Design for Cyber-Physical Systems

MNIT, Jaipur

27 July 2020

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Talk - Outline

- Smart City Components as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
- Security Challenges in Cyber-Physical Systems
- Drawbacks of Existing Security Solutions
- Selected Proposed Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS) or Secure-by-Design (SbD) Solutions
- Conclusions and Future Directions

The Big Picture

Smart Cities is a Solution for Urban Migration

- Smart Cities: For effective management of limited resource to serve largest possible population to improve:
  - Livability
  - Workability
  - Sustainability

At Different Levels:
- ➢ Smart Village
- ➢ Smart State
- ➢ Smart Country

➢ Year 2050: 70% of world population will be urban

July 2016

Source: S. P. Mohanty, U. Choppali, and E. Kougianos, “Everything You wanted to Know about Smart Cities”, *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 2016, pp. 60--70.

Smart Cities - 3 Is

Instrumentation

The 3Is are provided by the Internet of Things (IoT).

Smart Cities



Intelligence

Interconnection

Source: Mohanty ISC2 2019 Keynote

Internet of Things (IoT) – Concept



Overall architecture:
- ❖ A configurable dynamic global network of networks
- ❖ Systems-of-Systems

Source: Mohanty ICIT 2017 Keynote

Internet of Medical Things (IoMT)



Internet of Health Things (IoHT)

Requires:
- ❖ Data and Device Security
- ❖ Data Privacy

IoMT is a collection of medical devices and applications that connect to healthcare IT systems through Internet.

Source: http://www.icemiller.com/ice-on-fire-insights/publications/the-internet-of-health-things-privacy-and-security/
Source: http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/IoMT-Internet-of-Medical-Things

Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)



Source: https://www.rfpage.com/applications-of-industrial-internet-of-things/

Applications

- Industrial Automation
- Smart Robotics
- Predictive Maintenance
- Integration of Tools / Wearables
- Smart Logistics

IoT → CPS → Smart Cities



Cyber Physical System (CPS)

IoT → CPS (Smart Components) → Smart Cities

IoT is the Backbone Smart Cities.

Source: Mohanty CE Magazine July 2016

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) - 3 Cs



3 Cs of IoT - Connect, Compute, Communicate

Source: G. Jinghong, H. Ziwei, Z. Yan, Z. Tao, L. Yajie and Z. Fuxing, "An overview on cyber-physical systems of energy interconnection," in *Proc. IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid and Smart Cities (ICSGSC)*, 2017, pp. 15-21.

Healthcare Cyber-Physical System (H-CPS)



Fitness Trackers

Headband with Embedded Neurosensors



Embedded Skin Patches

Quality and sustainable healthcare with limited resources.

Source: Mohanty CE Magazine July 2016

Energy Cyber-Physical Systems (E-CPS)



March 2019

Smart Grid Model



Four key features of smart grid: Sensing, Measurement, Control, and Communications

Source: https://www.nist.gov/publications/nist-framework-and-roadmap-smart-grid-interoperability-standards-release-30

Energy Cyber-Physical Systems (E-CPS)



Quality, sustainable, uninterrupted energy with minimal carbon footprint.

Source: Mohanty CE Magazine July 2016

Internet of Energy

IoT Role:

- Management of energy usage
- Power generation dispatch for solar, wind, etc.
- Better fault-tolerance of the grid
- Services for plug-in electric vehicles (PEV)
- Enhancing consumer relationships

Security Challenges in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)

Cyber Attacks

September 2017: Cybersecurity incident at Equifax affected 143 million U.S. consumers.

Hacked: US Department Of Justice

Who did it: Unknown

What was done: Information on 10,000 DHS and 20,000 FBI employees.

Details: The method of the attack is still a mystery and it's been said that it took a week for the DOJ to realize that the info had been stolen.

February 2016

Hacked: Yahoo #2

Who did it: Unknown

What was done: 1 billion accounts were compromised.

Details: Users names, email addresses, date of birth, passwords, phone numbers, and security questions were all taken.

December 2016

IT Security Issue



May 2017

WannaCry ransomware affecting 150 countries

Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39920141

Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinanderton/2017/03/29/8-major-cyber-attacks-of-2016-infographic/#73bb0bee48e3

IoT Security - Attacks and Countermeasures



C- Confidentiality, I – Integrity, A - Availability, AC – Accountability, AU – Auditability, TW – Trustworthiness, NR - Non-repudiation, P - Privacy

Source: A. Mosenia, and Niraj K. Jha. "A Comprehensive Study of Security of Internet-of-Things", *IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing*, 5(4), 2016, pp. 586-602.

CE Systems – Diverse Security/ Privacy/ Ownership Requirements



Source: D. A. Hahn, A. Munir, and S. P. Mohanty, “Security and Privacy Issues in Contemporary Consumer Electronics”, IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE), Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2019, pp. 95--99.

Security, Privacy, and IP Rights

Hardware Trojan



System Security

Data Security

System Privacy

Data Privacy

Counterfeit Hardware
(IP Rights Violation)

Data Ownership

July 2017

Source: Mohanty ICIT 2017 Keynote

Selected Attacks on an Embedded System – Security, Privacy, IP Rights



Diverse forms of Attacks, following are not the same: System Security, Information Security, Information Privacy, System Trustworthiness, Hardware IP protection, Information Copyright Protection.

Source: Mohanty ZINC 2018 Keynote

Security Challenge - System

Power Grid Attack

Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/3177209/security/why-the-ukraine-power-grid-attacks-should-raise-alarm.html



Source: http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/01/technology/security/car-hack/

Source: http://politicalblindspot.com/u-s-drone-hacked-and-hijacked-with-ease/

Privacy Challenge – System, Location



Source: http://www.computerworld.com/article/3005436/cybercrime-hacking/black-hat-europe-it-s-easy-and-costs-only-60-to-hack-self-driving-car-sensors.html

Privacy Challenge – Personal Data

Source: http://ciphercloud.com/three-ways-pursue-cloud-data-privacy-medical-records/



Source: http://blog.veriphyr.com/2012/06/electronic-medical-records-security-and.html

Smart Healthcare - Security and Privacy Issue

Selected Smart Healthcare Security/Privacy Challenges

- Data Eavesdropping
- Data Confidentiality
- Data Privacy
- Location Privacy
- Identity Threats
- Access Control
- Unique Identification
- Data Integrity
- Device Security

Source: Mohanty iSES 2018 Keynote

IoMT Security Issue is Real & Scary

- Insulin pumps are vulnerable to hacking, FDA warns amid recall:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/06/28/insulin-pumps-are-vulnerable-hacking-fda-warns-amid-recall/

- Software vulnerabilities in some medical devices could leave them susceptible to hackers, FDA warns:

https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/health/fda-medical-devices-hackers-trnd/index.html

- FDA Issues Recall For Medtronic mHealth Devices Over Hacking Concerns:

https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/fda-issues-recall-for-medtronic-mhealth-devices-over-hacking-concerns

Implantable Medical Devices - Attacks

- The vulnerabilities affect implantable cardiac devices and the external equipment used to communicate with them.
- The devices emit RF signals that can be detected up to several meters from the body.
- A malicious individual nearby could conceivably hack into the signal to jam it, alter it, or snoop on it.

Source: Emily Waltz, Can "Internet-of-Body" Thwart Cyber Attacks on Implanted Medical Devices?, *IEEE Spectrum*, 28 Mar 2019, https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/biomedical/devices/thwart-cyber-attacks-on-implanted-medical-devices.amp.html.

IoMT Security – Selected Attacks



Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, “PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things”, *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.

Smart Grid - Vulnerability



ICT components of smart grid is cyber vulnerable.

Source: (1) R. K. Kaur, L. K. Singh and B. Pandey, "Security Analysis of Smart Grids: Successes and Challenges," *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 10-15, March 2019.
(2)https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services/smart-grids/smart-grids-and-smart-metering/ENISA_Annex%20II%20-%20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf

Smart Grid - Vulnerability



Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components of smart grid is cyber vulnerable.

Data, Application/System Software, Firmware of Embedded System are the loop holes for security/privacy.

Network/Communication Components

Phasor Measurement Units (PMU)

Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC)

Energy Storage Systems (ESS)

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)

Smart Meters

Smart Grid Model – CPS Security Perspective

Source: Y. Mo *et al*., "Cyber–Physical Security of a Smart Grid Infrastructure“, *Proceedings of the IEEE*, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 195-209, Jan. 2012.

Smart Grid Attacks can be Catastrophic

Vulnerabilities

Threats	Vulnerabilities
Security group knowledge	Management deficiencies of network access rules Inaccurate critical assests documentation
Information leakage	Unencrypted services in IT systems Weak protection credentials
Access point	Improper access point Remote access deficiency Firewall filtering deficiency
Unpatched System	Unpatched operating system Unpatched third party application
Weak cyber security	Buffer overflow in control system services SQL injection vulnerability

Source of Threats

- Phishers
- Nation
- Hacker
- Insider
- Terrorist
- Spammers
- Spyware /Malware authors

Attacks

- Stuxnet
- Night Dragon
- Virus
- Denial of service
- Trojan horse
- Worm
- Zero day exploit
- Logical bomb
- Phishing
- Distributed DoS
- False data Injection attack

Impacts

- Ukraine power attack, 2015
- Stuxnet attack in Iran, 2010
- Browns Ferry plant, Alabama 2006
- Emergency shut down of Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, 2008
- Slammer attack at Davis-Besse power plant, 2001
- Attacks at South Korea NPP, 2015

Source: R. K. Kaur, L. K. Singh and B. Pandey, "Security Analysis of Smart Grids: Successes and Challenges," *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 10-15, March 2019.

System Security – Smart Car

Selected Attacks on Autonomous Cars

- Replay
- Relay
- Jamming
- Spoofing
- Tracking



Cars can have 100 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and 100 million lines of code, each from different vendors – Massive security issues.

Source: http://www.computerworld.com/article/3005436/cybercrime-hacking/black-hat-europe-it-s-easy-and-costs-only-60-to-hack-self-driving-car-sensors.html

Source: https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf

Source: Petit 2015: IEEE-TITS Apr 2015

Smart Car – Modification of Input Signal of Control Can be Dangerous

- Typically vehicles are controlled by human drivers
- Designing an Autonomous Vehicle (AV) requires decision chains.
- AV actuators controlled by algorithms.
- Decision chain involves sensor data, perception, planning and actuation.
- Perception transforms sensory data to useful information.
- Planning involves decision making.



Source: Plathottam 2018, COMSNETS 2018

NFC Security - Attacks

Selected NFC Attacks
- Eavesdropping
- Data Modification
- Relay Attacks
- Data Corruption
- Spoofing
- Interception Attacks
- Theft

Source: http://www.idigitaltimes.com/new-android-nfc-attack-could-steal-money-credit-cards-anytime-your-phone-near-445497



Eavesdropping

Source: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/near-field-communication-nfc-technology-vulnerabilities-and-principal-attack-schema/

Relay Attack

Source: https://www.slideshare.net/cgvwzq/on-relaying-nfc-payment-transactions-using-android-devices

RFID Security - Attacks



Selected RFID Attacks

- Physical RFID Threats
  - Disabling Tags
  - Tag Modification
  - Cloning Tags
  - Reverse Engineering and Physical Exploration
- RFID Channel Threats
  - Eavesdropping
  - Snooping
  - Skimming
  - Replay Attack
  - Relay Attacks
  - Electromagnetic Interference
- System Threats
  - Counterfeiting and Spoofing Attacks
  - Tracing and Tracking
  - Password Decoding
  - Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks

Numerous Applications

Source: Khattab 2017: Springer 2017 RFID Security

Trojans can Provide Backdoor Entry to Adversary

Provide backdoor to adversary.
Chip fails during critical needs.

Information may bypass giving a non-watermarked or non-encrypted output.

Hardware Trojans



Source: Mohanty 2015, McGraw-Hill 2015

How Secure is AES Encryption?

- Brute force a 128 bit key ?
- If you assume
  - Every person on the planet owns 10 computers
  - Each of these computers can test 1 billion key combinations per second
  - There are 7 billion people on the planet
  - On average, you can crack the key after testing 50% of the possibilities
  - Then the earth's population can crack one 128 bit encryption key in 77,000,000,000 years (77 billion years)

Age of the Earth 4.54 ± 0.05 billion years

Age of the Universe 13.799 ± 0.021 billion years

Source: Parameswaran Keynote iNIS-2017

Side Channel Analysis Attacks



Breaking Encryption is not a matter of Years, but a matter of Hours.

Source: Parameswaran Keynote iNIS-2017

Side Channel Attacks – Differential and Correlation Power Analysis (DPA/CDA)



Source: Mohanty 2018, ZINC Keynote 2018

Side Channel Attacks - Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)

- CPA analyzes the correlative relationship between the plaintext/ cipher-text and instantaneous power consumption of the cryptographic device.
- CPA is a more effective attacking method compared with DPA.

Differential Power Analysis (DPA)	Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)
❖ Attacks using relationship between data and power.	❖ Attacks using relationship between data and power.
❖ Looks at difference of category averages for all key guess.	❖ Looks at correlation between all key guesses.
❖ Requires more power traces than CPA.	❖ Requires less power traces than DPA.
❖ Slower and less efficient than CPA.	❖ Faster, more accurate than DPA.

Source: Zhang and Shi ITNG 2011

Firmware Reverse Engineering – Security Threat for Embedded System



Extract, modify, or reprogram code



OS exploitation,
Device jailbreaking

Source: http://jcjc-dev.com/

Source: http://grandideastudio.com/wp-content/uploads/current_state_of_hh_slides.pdf

Attacks on Embedded Systems' Memory

Read confidential information in memory

Replace a block with fake



Replace a block with a block from another location

Physical access memory to retrieve encryption keys

Value of a block at a given address at one time is written at exactly the same address at a different times; Hardest attack.

Source: S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomathisankaran, and S. P. Mohanty, “TSV: A Novel Energy Efficient Memory Integrity Verification Scheme for Embedded Systems”, *Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture*, Vol. 59, No. 7, Aug 2013, pp. 400-411.

AI Security - Attacks



Source: Sandip Kundu ISVLSI 2019 Keynote.

AI Security - Trojans in Artificial Intelligence (TrojAI)



Adversaries can insert **Trojans** into AIs, leaving a trigger for bad behavior that they can activate during the AI's operations

Source: https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1150&Itemid=448

Drawbacks of Existing Security Solutions

CPS Security – Selected Solutions

Analysis of selected approaches to security and privacy issues in CE.			
Category	**Current Approaches**	**Advantages**	**Disadvantages**
Confidentiality	Symmetric key cryptography	Low computation overhead	Key distribution problem
	Asymmetric key cryptography	Good for key distribution	High computation overhead
Integrity	Message authentication codes	Verification of message contents	Additional computation overhead
Availability	Signature-based authentication	Avoids unnecessary signature computations	Requires additional infrastructure and rekeying scheme
Authentication	Physically unclonable functions (PUFs)	High speed	Additional implementation challenges
	Message authentication codes	Verification of sender	Computation overhead
Nonrepudiation	Digital signatures	Link message to sender	Difficult in pseudonymous systems
Identity privacy	Pseudonym	Disguise true identity	Vulnerable to pattern analysis
	Attribute-based credentials	Restrict access to information based on shared secrets	Require shared secrets with all desired services
Information privacy	Differential privacy	Limit privacy exposure of any single data record	True user-level privacy still chal- lenging
	Public-key cryptography	Integratable with hardware	Computationally intensive
Location privacy	Location cloaking	Personalized privacy	Requires additional infrastructure
Usage privacy	Differential privacy	Limit privacy exposure of any single data record	Recurrent/time-series data challenging to keep private

Source: D. A. Hahn, A. Munir, and S. P. Mohanty, "Security and Privacy Issues in Contemporary Consumer Electronics", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2019, pp. 95--99.

IT Security Solutions Can't be Directly Extended to IoT/CPS Security

IT Security

- IT infrastructure may be well protected rooms
- Limited variety of IT network devices
- Millions of IT devices
- Significant computational power to run heavy-duty security solutions
- IT security breach can be costly

IoT Security

- IoT may be deployed in open hostile environments
- Significantly large variety of IoT devices
- Billions of IoT devices
- May not have computational power to run security solutions
- IoT security breach (e.g. in a IoMT device like pacemaker, insulin pump) can be life threatening

Maintaining of Security of Consumer Electronics, Electronic Systems, IoT, CPS, etc. needs Energy and affects performance.

Wearable Medical Devices (WMDs)

Fitness Trackers

Headband with Embedded Neurosensors



Embedded Skin Patch

Source: http://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/8087/20160107/ces-loreals-smart-skin-patch-reveals-long-exposed-sun.htm

Source: https://www.empatica.com/embrace2/

Smart watch to detect seizure

Wearable Medical Devices (WMDs)
→ Battery Constrained

Insulin Pump

Source: https://www.webmd.com

Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs)

Pill Camera



Source: P. Sundaravadivel, E. Kougianos, S. P. Mohanty, and M. Ganapathiraju, "Everything You Wanted to Know about Smart Health Care", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 18-28.



Brain Pacemaker

Collectively:
Implantable and Wearable Medical Devices (IWMDs)

Implantable MEMS Device



Source: http://web.mit.edu/cprl/www/research.shtml

Security Measures in Healthcare Cyber-Physical Systems is Hard



Collectively (WMD+IMD): Implantable and Wearable Medical Devices (IWMDs)

Implantable and Wearable Medical Devices (IWMDs) -- Battery Characteristics:
- → Longer life
- → Safer
- → Smaller size
- → Smaller weight

H-CPS Security Measures is Hard - Energy Constrained



Pacemaker Battery Life - 10 years

Neurostimulator Battery Life - 8 years

- Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) have integrated battery to provide energy to all their functions → Limited Battery Life depending on functions
- Higher battery/energy usage → Lower IMD lifetime
- Battery/IMD replacement → Needs surgical risky procedures

Source: Carmen Camara, PedroPeris-Lopeza, and Juan E.Tapiadora, "Security and privacy issues in implantable medical devices: A comprehensive survey", *Elsevier Journal of Biomedical Informatics*, Volume 55, June 2015, Pages 272-289.

Smart Car Security - Latency Constrained

Protecting Communications
Particularly any Modems for In-vehicle Infotainment (IVI) or in On-board Diagnostics (OBD-II)

Over The Air (OTA) Management
From the Cloud to Each Car

Cars can have 100 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and 100 million lines of code, each from different vendors – Massive security issues.

Protecting Each Module
Sensors, Actuators, and Anything with an Microcontroller Unit (MCU)

Mitigating Advanced Threats
Analytics in the Car and in the Cloud

- Connected cars require latency of ms to communicate and avoid impending crash:
  - Faster connection
  - Low latency
  - Energy efficiency

Security Mechanism Affects:
- Latency
- Mileage
- Battery Life

Car Security – Latency Constraints

Source: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_papers/public-building-security-into-cars-20150805.pdf

UAV Security - Energy & Latency Constrained



Source: http://www.secmation.com/control-design/

Security Mechanisms Affect:

Battery Life | Latency | Weight | Aerodynamics

UAV Security – Energy and Latency Constraints

Source: http://politicalblindspot.com/u-s-drone-hacked-and-hijacked-with-ease/

Smart Grid Security Constraints

Smart Grid – Security Objectives
- Availability
- Integrity
- Confidentiality

Smart Grid – Security Requirements
- Identification
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Trust
- Access Control
- Privacy

Smart Grid – Security Solution Constraints
- Transactions Latency
- Communication Latency
- Transactions Computational Overhead
- Energy Overhead on Embedded Devices
- Security Budget

Source: R. K. Pandey and M. Misra, "Cyber security threats - Smart grid infrastructure," in *Proc. National Power Systems Conference (NPSC)*, 2016, pp. 1-6.

Blockchain Technology



Source: https://icomalta.com/distributed-ledger-technology/

Blockchain Applications



Source: Deepak Puthal, Nisha Malik, Saraju P. Mohanty, Elias Kougianos, and Gautam Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 6--14, 2018.

Blockchain has Many Challenges



Source: D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, “Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain”, *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, July 2018, pp. 06--14.

Blockchain Energy Need is Huge

Energy for mining of 1 bitcoin

Energy consumption 2 years of a US household

Energy consumption for each bitcoin transaction

80,000X

Energy consumption of a credit card processing

Blockchain has Security Challenges

Selected attacks on the blockchain and defences		
Attacks	Descriptions	Defence
Double spending	Many payments are made with a body of funds	Complexity of mining process
Record hacking	Blocks are modified, and fraudulent transactions are inserted	Distributed consensus
51% attack	A miner with more than half of the network's computational power dominates the verification process	Detection methods and design of incentives
Identity theft	An entity's private key is stolen	Reputation of the blockchain on identities
System hacking	The software systems that implement a blockchain are compromised	Advanced intrusion detection systems

Source: N. Kolokotronis, K. Limniotis, S. Shiaeles, and R. Griffiths, "Secured by Blockchain: Safeguarding Internet of Things Devices," *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 28–34, May 2019.

Blockchain has Serious Privacy Issue

	Bitcoin	Dash	Monero	Verge	PIVX	Zcash
Origin	-	Bitcoin	Bytecoin	Bitcoin	Dash	Bitcoin
Release	January 2009	January 2014	April 2014	October 2014	February 2016	October 2016
Consensus Algorithm	PoW	PoW	PoW	PoW	PoS	PoW
Hardware Mineable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Block Time	600 sec.	150 sec.	120 sec.	30 sec.	60 sec.	150 sec.
Rich List	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Master Node	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Sender Address Hidden	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Receiver Address Hidden	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sent Amount Hidden	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
IP Addresses Hidden	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Privacy	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Untraceability	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Fungibility	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Source: J. Lee, "Rise of Anonymous Cryptocurrencies: Brief Introduction", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 20-25, 1 Sept. 2019.

Smart Contracts - Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability	Cause	Level
Call to unknown	The called function does not exist	Contract’s source code
Out-of-gas send	Fallback of the callee is executed	Contract’s source code
Exception disorder	Exception handling irregularity	Contract’s source code
Type casts	Contract execution type-check error	Contract’s source code
Reentrance flaw	Function reentered before exit	Contract’s source code
Field disclosure	Private value published by miner	Contract’s source code
Immutable bug	Contract altering after deployment	Ethereum virtual machine bytecode
Ether lost	Ether sent to orphan address	Ethereum virtual machine bytecode
Unpredicted state	Contract state change before call	Blockchain Mechanism
Randomness bug	Seed biased by malicious miner	Blockchain mechanism
Time-stamp failure	Malicious miner alters time stamp	Blockchain mechanism

Source: N. Kolokotronis, K. Limniotis, S. Shiaeles, and R. Griffiths, “Secured by Blockchain: Safeguarding Internet of Things Devices,” *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 28–34, May 2019.

Security Attacks Can be Software and Hardware Based



Software Based

- Software attacks via communication channels
- Typically from remote
- More frequent
- Selected Software based:
  - Denial-of-Service (DoS)
  - Routing Attacks
  - Malicious Injection
  - Injection of fraudulent packets
  - Snooping attack of memory
  - Spoofing attack of memory and IP address
  - Password-based attacks

Hardware Based

- Hardware or physical attacks
- Maybe local
- More difficult to prevent
- Selected Hardware based:
  - Hardware backdoors (e.g. Trojan)
  - Inducing faults
  - Electronic system tampering/ jailbreaking
  - Eavesdropping for protected memory
  - Side channel attack
  - Hardware counterfeiting

Source: Mohanty ICCE Panel 2018

Security - Software Vs Hardware

Software Based

- Introduces latency in operation
- Flexible - Easy to use, upgrade and update
- Wider-Use - Use for all devices in an organization
- Higher recurring operational cost
- Tasks of encryption easy compared to hardware – substitution tables
- Needs general purpose processor
- Can't stop hardware reverse engineering

Hardware Based



- High-Speed operation
- Energy-Efficient operation
- Low-cost using ASIC and FPGA
- Tasks of encryption easy compared to software – bit permutation
- Easy integration in CE systems
- Possible security at source-end like sensors, better suitable for IoT
- Susceptible to side-channel attacks
- Can't stop software reverse engineering

Source: Mohanty ICCE Panel 2018

IoT/CPS Design – Multiple Objectives



Source: Mohanty ICCE 2019 Keynote

A Security Nightmare - by Quantum Computing



Cloud Computing using Quantum

- Ultra-Fast quantum computing resources
- High latency in network
- Breaks every encryption in no time

Edge Computing

- Less computational resource
- Minimal latency in network
- Lightweight security

In-Sensor/End-Device Computing

- Minimal computational resource
- Negligible latency in network
- Very lightweight security

A quantum computer could break a 2048-bit RSA encryption in 8 hours.

Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS) or Secure-by-Design (SbD)



Privacy by Design (PbD) → General Data Protection Regulation (GPDR)

1995
Privacy by Design (PbD)

- Treat privacy concerns as design requirements when developing technology, rather than trying to retrofit privacy controls after it is built

2018
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

- GDPR makes Privacy by Design (PbD) a legal requirement

Security by Design aka Secure by Design (SbD)

Security by Design (SbD) and/or Privacy by Design (PbD)

Embedding of security/privacy into the architecture (hardware+software) of various products, programs, or services.

Retrofitting: Difficult → Impossible!

Source: https://teachprivacy.com/tag/privacy-by-design/

Security by Design (SbD) and/or Privacy by Design (PbD)

7 Fundamental Principles

- Proactive not Reactive
- Security/Privacy as the Default
- Security/Privacy Embedded into Design
- Full Functionality - Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum
- End-to-End Security/Privacy - Lifecycle Protection
- Visibility and Transparency
- Respect for Users

Source: https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Privacy%20by%20Design%20-%207%20Foundational%20Principles.pdf

Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS)

- Hardware-Assisted Security: Security provided by hardware for:
  - (1) information being processed,
  - (2) hardware itself,
  - (3) overall system

Privacy by Design (PbD)

Security/Secure by Design (SbD)

- Additional hardware components used for security.
- Hardware design modification is performed.
- System design modification is performed.

RF Hardware Security | Digital Hardware Security – Side Channel

Hardware Trojan Protection | Information Security, Privacy, Protection

IR Hardware Security | Memory Protection | Digital Core IP Protection

Source: Mohanty ICCE 2018 Panel

Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS)

- Software based Security:
  - A general purposed processor is a deterministic machine that computes the next instruction based on the program counter.
  - Software based security approaches that rely on some form of encryption can't be full proof as breaking them is just matter of time.
  - It is projected that quantum computers that use different paradigms than the existing computers will make things worse.
- Hardware-Assisted Security: Security/Protection provided by the hardware: for information being processed by a CE system, for hardware itself, and/or for the CE system.

Hardware Security Primitives – TPM, HSM, TrustZone, and PUF

Hardware Security Module (HSM)



Trusted Platform Module (TPM)





Source: C. Marforio, N. Karapanos, C. Soriente, K. Kostiainen, and S. Capkun, *Smartphones as Practical and Secure Location Verification Tokens for Payments*. 2014.

Keep It Simple Stupid (KISS) → Keep It Isolated Stupid (KIIS)



Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF)

Source: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)

- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are primitives for security.
- PUFs are easy to build and impossible to duplicate.
- The input and output are called a Challenge Response Pair.



PUFs don't store keys in digital memory, rather derive a key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware; thus secure.

Source: S. Joshi, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Wanted to Know about PUFs", *IEEE Potentials Magazine*, Volume 36, Issue 6, November-December 2017, pp. 38--46.

Principle of Generating Multiple Random Response using PUF



PUFs Don’t Store Keys



PUFs don’t store keys in digital memory, rather derive a key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware; thus secure.

Source: S. Joshi, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, “Everything You Wanted to Know about PUFs”, *IEEE Potentials Magazine*, Volume 36, Issue 6, November-December 2017, pp. 38--46.

PUF - Principle



Silicon manufacturing process variations are turned into a feature rather than a problem.

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Making Use of Semiconductor Manufacturing Process Variations: FinFET-based Physical Unclonable Functions for Efficient Security Integration in the IoT", *Springer Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing Journal*, Volume 93, Issue 3, December 2017, pp. 429--441.

We Have Design a Variety of PUFs



219 µW
150 ns

Power Optimized Hybrid Oscillator Arbiter PUF

Suitable for Healthcare CPS



250 µW
50 ns

Speed Optimized Hybrid Oscillator Arbiter PUF

Suitable for Transportation and Energy CPS

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Making Use of Semiconductor Manufacturing Process Variations: FinFET-based Physical Unclonable Functions for Efficient Security Integration in the IoT", *Springer Analog Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing Journal*, Volume 93, Issue 3, December 2017, pp. 429--441.

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) - Applications

Random Number Generator

Device Authentication

Memory Protection

Software Licensing

Secret Key Generation

Source: S. Joshi, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Wanted to Know about PUFs", IEEE Potentials Magazine, Volume 36, Issue 6, Nov-Dec 2017, pp. 38--46.

Secure Digital Camera – My Invention



Include additional/alternative hardware/software components and uses DVFS like technology for energy and performance optimization.

Security and/or Privacy by Design (SbD and/or PbD)

Source: S. P. Mohanty, "A Secure Digital Camera Architecture for Integrated Real-Time Digital Rights Management", Elsevier Journal of Systems Architecture (JSA), Volume 55, Issues 10-12, October-December 2009, pp. 468-480.

Secure Better Portable Graphics (SBPG)



Secure BPG (SBPG)



Secure Digital Camera (SDC) with SBPG



High-Efficiency Video Coding Architecture

Simulink Prototyping
Throughput: 44 frames/sec
Power Dissipation: 8 nW

Source: S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and P. Guturu, "SBPG: Secure Better Portable Graphics for Trustworthy Media Communications in the IoT (Invited Paper)", IEEE Access Journal, Volume 6, 2018, pp. 5939--5953.

Our Secure by Design Approach for Robust Security in Healthcare CPS



Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.

Our Secure by Design Approach for Robust Security in Healthcare CPS



Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.

IoMT Security – Our Proposed PMsec



At the Doctor
- as a new Device comes for an User

Enrollment Phase

Device Registration Procedure



PUF Security Full Proof:
- Only server PUF Challenges are stored, not Responses
- Impossible to generate Responses without PUF

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.

IoMT Security – Our Proposed PMsec



Authentication Phase

Device Authentication Procedure



Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, “PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things”, *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.

IoMT Security – Our PMsec in Action

```
------------Enrollment Phase------------
Generating the Keys
Sending the keys to the Client
Receiving the Keys from the client
Saving the database
>>>
```

Output from Server during Enrollment

```
COM4
Hello
Received Key from the Server
Generating PUF Key
PUF Key : 10111000010111001011110001011110001011010011011100101001010000011
Sending key for authentication
```

Output from IoMT Device

```
>>>
Hello
-----------Authentication Phase-----------
Input to the PUF at server : 01001101
Generating the PUF key
Sending the PUF key to the client
PUF Key from client is  10111000010111001011110001011110001011010011011100101001010000011
SHA256 of PUF Key is :  580cdc9339c940cdc60889c4d8a3bc1a3c1876750e88701cbd4f5223f6d23e76
Authentication Successful
>>> |
```

Output from Server during Authentication

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, “PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things”, *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (TCE)*, Volume 65, Issue 3, August 2019, pp. 388--397.

IoMT Security – Our Proposed PMsec



Average Power Overhead – 200 µW

Ring Oscillator PUF – 64-bit, 128-bit, …

Proposed Approach Characteristics	Value (in a FPGA / Raspberry Pi platform)
Time to Generate the Key at Server	800 ms
Time to Generate the Key at IoMT Device	800 ms
Time to Authenticate the Device	1.2 sec - 1.5 sec

Source: V. P. Yanambaka, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PMsec: Physical Unclonable Function-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication in the Internet of Medical Things", *IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics*, Vol 65, No 3, Aug 2019, pp. 388--397.

iGLU: Accurate Glucose Level Monitoring and Secure Insulin Delivery



P. Jain, A. M. Joshi, and S. P. Mohanty, “iGLU: An Intelligent Device for Accurate Non-Invasive Blood Glucose-Level Monitoring in Smart Healthcare”, *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE),* Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2020, pp. 35–42.

Secure-iGLU: Accurate Glucose Level Monitoring and Secure Insulin Delivery





Arbiter PUF – 64-bit, 128-bit, 256 bit …

Source: A. M. Joshi, P. Jain, and S. P. Mohanty, "Secure-iGLU: A Secure Device for Noninvasive Glucose Measurement and Automatic Insulin Delivery in IoMT Framework", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020.

Firmware Security - Solution



Our PUF based Solution can be used for Firmware Security of any Embedded Devices – Has significant impact on Security issues of Smart Grid as well as Smart Healthcare

Source: https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/white-paper/AUTOSECURITYWP.pdf

Vehicular Security

IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine

Volume 8 Number 6 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2019



Vehicular Security



November 2019

IEEE

https://cesoc.ieee.org/

Source: C. Labrado and H. Thapliyal, "Hardware Security Primitives for Vehicles," *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 99-103, Nov. 2019.

Autonomous Car Security – Collision Avoidance

- Attack: Feeding of malicious sensor measurements to the control and the collision avoidance module. Such an attack on a position sensor can result in collisions between the vehicles.
- Solutions: "**Dynamic Watermarking**" of signals to detect and stop such attacks on cyber-physical systems.
- Idea: Superimpose each actuator *i* a random signal $e_i[t]$ (watermark) on control policy-specified input.



Source: Ko 2016, CPS-Sec 2016

Our PoAh-Chain: The IoT Friendly Private Blockchain for Authentication



Source: D. Puthal and S. P. Mohanty, "Proof of Authentication: IoT-Friendly Blockchains", *IEEE Potentials Magazine*, Volume 38, Issue 1, January 2019, pp. 26--29.

Blockchain Consensus Types

- **Blockchain Consensus Algorithm**
  - Validation Based
    - Proof of Work (PoW)
    - Proof of Stack (PoS)
    - Proof of Activity (PoA)
    - Proof of Relevance (PoR)
    - Proof of Elapsed Time
  - Voting Based
    - Ripple
    - Proof of Vote
    - Proof of Trust
  - Authentication Based
    - Proof of Authentication (PoAh)
    - Proof of PUF-Enabled Authentication (PoP) (**Current Paper**)

Blockchain Challenges - Energy



Source: D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Everything you Wanted to Know about the Blockchain", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, July 2018, pp. 06--14.

Our Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)



Our PoAh-Chain: Proposed New Block Structure



Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and DataSecurity in the Internet of Everything(IoE)", arXiv Computer Science, arXiv:1909.06496, Sep 2019, 37-pages.

Our PoAh: Authentication Process



Steps to find a Trusted Node which will Authenticate a Block.

Algorithm 1: PoAh Block Authentication

Provided:

All nodes in the network follow SHA-256 Hash

Individual node has Private (PrK) and Public key (PuK)

Steps:

(1) Nodes combine transactions to form blocks

$(Trx^{+}) \rightarrow$ blocks

(2) Blocks sign with own private key

S_{PrK} (block) $\rightarrow$ broadcast

(3) Trusted node verifies signature with source public key

V_{PuK}(block) $\rightarrow$ MAC Checking

(4) If (Authenticated)

Block||PoAh(ID) $\rightarrow$ broadcast

H(block) $\rightarrow$ Add blocks into chain

(5) Else

Drop blocks

(6) GOTO (Step-1) for next block

Our PoAh-Chain Runs in Resource Constrained Environment



Our PoAh-Chain Runs here

5 W

Blockchain using PoW Needs Significant Resource

Source: https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2019/july/bitcoin-energy-use-mined-the-gap.html

500,0000 W

Our PoAh is 200X Faster than PoW While Consuming a Very Minimal Energy

Consensus Algorithm	**Blockchain Type**	**Prone To Attacks**	**Power Consumption**	**Time for Consensus**
Proof-of-Work (PoW)	Public	Sybil, 51%	538 KWh	10 min
Proof-of-Stake (PoS)	Public	Sybil, Dos	5.5 KWh	
Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)	Private	Not Known	3.5 W	3 sec



PoAh Execution for 100s of Nodes

Source: D. Puthal, S. P. Mohanty, P. Nanda, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, "Proof-of-Authentication for Scalable Blockchain in Resource-Constrained Distributed Systems", in *Proc. 37th IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE)*, 2019.

We Proposed World's First Hardware-Integrated Blockchain (PUFchain) that is Scalable, Energy-Efficient, and Fast



PUFchain: The Hardware-Assisted Scalable Blockchain



Can provide:
Device, System, and Data Security

PUFChain 2 Modes:
(1) PUF Mode and
(2) PUFChain Mode



Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and Data Security in Internet of Everything (IoE)", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE)*, Vol. 9, No. 2, March 2020, pp. in Press.

Our Proof-of-PUF-Enabled-Authentication (PoP)



PUFchain: Proposed New Block Structure

Conventional Block Structure

- Block in Conventional Blockchain (B_i)
- Hash of Previous Block
- Number only used once (Nonce)
- Transactions Tx1, Tx2, …, TxN

Hash of the following:

- Hash of B_{i-2}
- Nonce of B_{i-1}
- Transactions of B_{i-1}

Proposed Block Structure for PUFchain

- Block in PUFChain(B_i)
- Hash of Previous Block
- Unique Block Token (UBT)
- Transactions Tx1, Tx2, …, TxN

Hash of the following:

- Hash of B_{i-2}
- UBT of B_{i-1}
- Device ID
- PUF Unique Identifier
- Transactions of B_{i-1}

PUFchain: Device Enrollment Steps



Device Enrollment Steps

Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, “PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and Data Security in Internet of Everything (IoE)”, *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (MCE)*, Vol. 9, No. 2, March 2020, pp. in Press.

Steps of Proof-of-PUF-Enabled-Authentication (PoP)



PUFchain Security Validation



S - the source of the block

D - the miner or authenticator node in the networks



PUFchain Security Verification in Scyther simulation environment proves that PUFChain is secure against potential network threats.

Our PoP is 1000X Faster than PoW



PoW - 10 min in cloud	PoAh – 950ms in Raspberry Pi	PoP - 192ms in Raspberry Pi
High Power	3 W Power	5 W Power

- ✓ PoP is 1,000X faster than PoW
- ✓ PoP is 5X faster than PoAh

Source: S. P. Mohanty, V. P. Yanambaka, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "PUFchain: Hardware-Assisted Blockchain for Sustainable Simultaneous Device and DataSecurity in the Internet of Everything(IoE)", arXiv Computer Science, arXiv:1909.06496, Sep 2019, 37-pages.

Our Multi-Chain Technology to Enhance Scalability



Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, “McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems”, *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020

A Perspective of BC, Tangle Vs Our Multichain

Features/Technology	Blockchain (Bitcoin)	Proof of Authentication	Tangle	HashGraph	McPoRA (current Paper)
Linked Lists	• One linked list of blocks. • Block of transactions.	• One linked list of blocks. • Block of transactions.	• DAG linked list. • One transaction.	• DAG linked List. • Container of transactions hash	• DAG linked List. • Block of transactions. • Reduced block.
Validation	Mining	Authentication	Mining	Virtual Voting (witness)	Authentication
Type of validation	Miners	Trusted Nodes	Transactions	Containers	All Nodes
Ledger Requirement	Full ledger required	Full ledger required	Portion based on longest and shortest paths.	Full ledger required	Portion based on authenticators' number
Cryptography	Digital Signatures	Digital Signatures	Quantum key signature	Digital Signatures	Digital Signatures
Hash function	SHA 256	SHA 256	KECCAK-384	SHA 384	SCRYPT
Consensus	Proof of Work	Cryptographic Authentication	Proof of Work	aBFT	Predefined UID
Numeric System	Binary	Binary	Trinity	Binary	Binary
Involved Algorithms	HashCash	No	• Selection Algorithm • HashCash	No	BFP
Decentralization	Partially	Partially	Fully	Fully	Fully
Appending Requirements	Longest chain	One chain	Selection Algorithm	Full Randomness	Filtration Process
Energy Requirements	High	Low	High	Medium	Low
Node Requirements	High Resources Node	Limited Resources Node	High Resources Node	High Resources Node	Limited Resources Node
Design Purpose	Cryptocurrency	IoT applications	IoT/Cryptocurrency	Cryptocurrency	IoT/CPS applications

Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020.

McPoRA Components







Secure Unique Identification List (SUIL)

Secure IDs' file consists of all active Nodes joined the Private network.

Hashed
Node A Unique Identification (UID)
Node B Unique Identification (UID)
Node C Unique Identification (UID)
Node D Unique Identification (UID)
Node E Unique Identification (UID)
Node F Unique Identification (UID)
Node G Unique Identification (UID)
Node H Unique Identification (UID)
Node I Unique Identification (UID)

Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020

Block Structure in McPoRA



(a) For Traditional Blockchain

(b) For Proposed Post-Blockchain

Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, "McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems", *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020

McPoRA Results

Time (ms)	Authentication (ms)	Reduction (ms)
Minimum	1.51	252.6
Maximum	35.14	1354.6
Average	3.97	772.53





Source: A. J. Alkhodair, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and D. Puthal, “McPoRA: A Multi-Chain Proof of Rapid Authentication for Post-Blockchain based Security in Large Scale Complex Cyber-Physical Systems”, *Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)*, 2020

Smart Grid Security - Solutions

Smart Grid – Security Solutions

- Network Security
- Data Security
- Key Management
- Network Security Protocol

Smart Meter


Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)

Smart Grid Cybersecurity - Strategies

- Make Smart Grids Survivable
- Use Scalable Security Measures
- Integrate Security and Privacy by Design
- Deploy a Defense-in-Depth Approach
- Enhance Traditional Security Measures

Source: S. Conovalu and J. S. Park. "Cybersecurity strategies for smart grids“, *Journal of Computers*, Vol. 11, no. 4, (2016): 300-310.

Smart Grid Security - Solutions



Source: A. S. Musleh, G. Yao and S. M. Muyeen, "Blockchain Applications in Smart Grid–Review and Frameworks," IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 86746-86757, 2019.

Eternal-Thing: Combines Security and Energy Harvesting at the Edge



Provides security while consuming only 22μW power due to harvesting.

Source: S. K. Ram, S. R. Sahoo, Banee, B.Das, K. K. Mahapatra, and S. P. Mohanty, “Eternal-Thing: A Secure Aging-Aware Solar-Energy Harvester Thing for Sustainable IoT”, *IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing*, Vol. XX, No. YY, ZZ 2019, pp. Under Review.

Eternal-Thing 2.0: Combines Analog-Trojan Resilience and Energy Harvesting at the Edge



Source: S. K. Ram, S. R. Sahoo, Banee, B.Das, K. K. Mahapatra, and S. P. Mohanty, “Eternal-Thing 2.0: Analog-Trojan Resilient Ripple-Less Solar Harvesting System for Sustainable IoT”, *ACM Journal on Emerging Technology in Computing*, Vol. XX, No. YY, ZZ 2019, pp. Under Review.

Data and Security Should be Distributed using Edge Datacenter



Source: D. Puthal, M. S. Obaidat, P. Nanda, M. Prasad, S. P. Mohanty, and A. Y. Zomaya, “Secure and Sustainable Load Balancing of Edge Data Centers in Fog Computing”, *IEEE Communications Magazine*, Volume 56, Issue 5, May 2018, pp. 60--65.

Our Proposed Secure Edge Datacenter



Algorithm 1: Load Balancing Technique

1. If (EDC-I is overloaded)
2. EDC-I broadcast (E_i, L_i)
3. EDC-J (neighbor EDC) verifies:
4. If (E_i is in database) & ($p \leq 0.6$ & $L_i << (n-m)$)
5. Response $E_{Kpu_i}(E_j || K_j || p)$
6. EDC-I perform $D_{Kpr_i}(E_j || K_j || p)$
7. $k'_j \leftarrow E_j$
8. If ($k'_j = k_j$)
9. EDC-I select EDC-J for load balancing.

Secure edge datacenter –
- Balances load among the EDCs
- Authenticates EDCs

Response time of the destination EDC has reduced by 20-30% using the proposed allocation approach.

Source: D. Puthal, M. S. Obaidat, P. Nanda, M. Prasad, S. P. Mohanty, and A. Y. Zomaya, "Secure and Sustainable Load Balancing of Edge Data Centers in Fog Computing", *IEEE Communications Magazine*, Volume 56, Issue 5, May 2018, pp. 60--65.

Nonvolatile Memory Security and Protection

Source: http://datalocker.com

Hardware-based encryption of data secured/protected by strong password/PIN authentication.

Software-based encryption to secure systems and partitions of hard drive.

Nonvolatile / Harddrive Storage

Some performance penalty due to increase in latency!

Embedded Memory Security



On-Chip/On-Board Memory Protection



Memory integrity verification with 85% energy savings with minimal performance overhead.

Source: S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomathisankaran, and S. P. Mohanty, “MEM-DnP: A Novel Energy Efficient Approach for Memory Integrity Detection and Protection in Embedded Systems”, Springer Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing Journal (CSSP), Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2013, pp. 2581--2604.

DPA Resilience Hardware Design



Uniform Power Profile achieved for side channel attack security with some area and minor delay overhead.







Source: J. Mathew, S. P. Mohanty, S. Banerjee, D. K. Pradhan, and A. M. Jabir, "Attack Tolerant Cryptographic Hardware Design by Combining Galois Field Error Correction and Uniform Switching Activity", *Elsevier Computers and Electrical Engineering*, Vol. 39, No. 4, May 2013, pp. 1077--1087.

End, Edge Vs Cloud - Security, Intelligence



End Security/Intelligence

- Minimal Data
- Minimal Computational Resource
- Least Accurate Data Analytics
- Very Rapid Response

Edge Security/Intelligence

- Less Data
- Less Computational Resource
- Less Accurate Data Analytics
- Rapid Response

Cloud Security/Intelligence

- Big Data
- Lots of Computational Resource
- Accurate Data Analytics
- Latency in Network
- Energy overhead in Communications

Source: Mohanty iSES Keynote 2018 and ICCE 2019 Panel

Security, Authentication, Access Control – Home, Facilities, ...





Security Methods (Authentication)

- Facial Recognition
- Fingerprint
- Personal Identification Number (PIN)
- Password
- Touch-Screen Pattern
- Online Signature
- Electrocardiography (ECG)
- Electroencephalography (EEG)
- Finger Vein

Source: Mohanty ISCT 2019 Keynote

NFC Security - Solution







Payer Module **Payee Module**

Source: S. Ghosh, J. Goswami, A. Majumder, A. Kumar, S. P. Mohanty, and B. K. Bhattacharyya, "Swing-Pay: One Card Meets All User Payment and Identity Needs", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 6, Issue 1, January 2017, pp. 82--93.

RFID Security - Solutions

Selected RFID Security Methods

- Killing Tags
- Sleeping Tags
- Faraday Cage
- Blocker Tags
- Tag Relabeling
- Minimalist Cryptography
- Proxy Privacy Devices

Faraday Cage





Blocker Tags

Source: Khattab 2017, Springer 2017 RFID Security

Data Holds the Key for Intelligence in CPS

Smart Healthcare - System and Data Analytics : To Perform Tasks

Systems & Analytics
- Health cloud server
- Edge server
- Implantable Wearable Medical Devices (IWMDs)

Machine Learning Engine

↑

Data
- Physiological data
- Environmental data
- Genetic data
- Historical records
- Demographics

Systems & Analytics
- Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSSs)
- Electronic Health Records (EHRs)

Machine Learning Engine

↑

Data
- Physician observations
- Laboratory test results
- Genetic data
- Historical records
- Demographics

Source: Hongxu Yin, Ayten Ozge Akmandor, Arsalan Mosenia and Niraj K. Jha (2018), "Smart Healthcare", *Foundations and Trends® in Electronic Design Automation*, Vol. 12: No. 4, pp 401-466. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1000000054

Fake Data and Fake Hardware – Both are Equally Dangerous in CPS

AI can be fooled by fake data

AI can create fake data (Deepfake)

Authentic Fake

An implantable medical device

Authentic Fake

A plug-in for car-engine computers

DNNs – Can be Fooled by Fake Data?

- Why not use Fake Data?
- "Fake Data" has some interesting advantages:
  - Avoids *privacy issues* and side-steps *new regulations* (e.g. General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR)
  - Significant cost reductions in data acquisition and annotation for big datasets

Source: Corcoran Keynote 2018



Secure Data Curation a Solution?



Edge Training:
- Data Signature
- Model Signature

Cloud Training:
- Data Signature
- Model Signature

Fake Data Defense:
- Stop (Shield)
- Detect

Source: C. Yang, D. Puthal, S. P. Mohanty, and E. Kougianos, "Big-Sensing-Data Curation for the Cloud is Coming", IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM), Volume 6, Issue 4, October 2017, pp. 48--56.

Data and System Authentication and Ownership Protection – My 20 Years of Experiences



System

IP cores or reusable cores are used as a cost effective SoC solution but sharing poses a security and ownership issues.





Source: S. P. Mohanty, A. Sengupta, P. Guturu, and E. Kougianos, "Everything You Want to Know About Watermarking", *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (CEM),* Volume 6, Issue 3, July 2017, pp. 83--91.

Data and System Authentication …



Verify / Authenticate Signature before using the data.

Data

Source: S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and P. Guturu, "SBPG: Secure Better Portable Graphics for Trustworthy Media Communications in the IoT (Invited Paper)", *IEEE Access Journal*, Vol 6, 2018, pp. 5939--5953.

System





PUF as Hardware Fingerprint

Source: A. Sengupta, D. Roy, and S. P. Mohanty, "Triple-Phase Watermarking for Reusable IP Core Protection during Architecture Synthesis", *IEEE Transactions on CAD*, Vol. 37, No 4, 2018, pp. 742--755.

Lowest Power Consuming Watermarking Chip



Datapath Architecture



Pin Diagram



Hardware Layout



DVDF Low-Power Design

Physical Design Data

Total Area : 16.2 sq mm

No. of Transistors: 1.4 million

Power Consumption: 0.3 mW

Source: S. P. Mohanty, N. Ranganathan, and K. Balakrishnan, "A Dual Voltage-Frequency VLSI Chip for Image Watermarking in DCT Domain", *IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II (TCAS-II)*, Vol. 53, No. 5, May 2006, pp. 394-398.

My Watermarking Research Inspired - TrustCAM





For integrity protection, authenticity and confidentiality of image data.

- Identifies sensitive image regions.
- Protects privacy sensitive image regions.
- A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip provides a set of security primitives.

Source: https://pervasive.aau.at/BR/pubs/2010/Winkler_AVSS2010.pdf

My Watermarking Research Inspired – Secured Sensor



Source: G. R. Nelson, G. A. Jullien, O. Yadid-Pecht, "CMOS Image Sensor With Watermarking Capabilities", in *Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems* (*ISCAS*), 2005, pp. 5326–5329.

Conclusions

Conclusions

- Security and Privacy are important problems in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS).
- Various elements and components of CPS including Data, Devices, System Components, AI need security.
- Both software and hardware-based attacks and solutions are possible.
- Security in H-CPS, E-CPS, and T-CPS, etc. can have serious consequences.
- Existing security solutions have serious overheads and may not even run in the end-devices (e.g. a medical device) of CPS/IoT.
- Hardware-Assisted Security (HAS): Security provided by hardware for: (1) information being processed, (2) hardware itself, (3) overall system. HAS/SbD advocate features at early design phases, no-retrofitting.

Future Directions

- Privacy and/or Security by Design (PbD or SbD) needs research.
- Security, Privacy, IP Protection of Information and System (in Cyber-Physical Systems or CPS) need more research.
- Security of systems (e.g. Smart Healthcare device/data, Smart Grid, UAV, Smart Cars) needs research.
- Sustainable Smart City: needs sustainable IoT/CPS