iTPM: Exploring PUF-based Keyless TPM for Security-by-Design of Smart Electronics

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
Outline

- Security-by-Design (SbD) Principles
- Novelty of Proposed PUF-based-TPM Security-by-Design primitive
- Related Research
- Working Flow of Proposed iTPM
- Experimental implementation Overview
- Conclusion & Future Research Directions




Security-by-Design (SbD) – The Principle







Applications of Security-by-Design (SbD)





Security by Design (SbD) and/or Privacy by Design (PbD)




- Security by Design (SbD) is a system design paradigm that ensures security and privacy are considered right from the beginning of the design phase so that retrofitting at the later stage is not needed.
- ❖ Privacy by Design (PbD) Treat privacy concerns as design requirements when developing technology, rather than trying to retrofit privacy controls after it is built.

Source: S. P. Mohanty, "Security and Privacy by Design is Key in the Internet of Everything (IoE) Era," in IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 4-5, 1 March 2020, doi: 10.1109/MCE.2019.2954959.

Security by Design (SbD) and/or Privacy by Design (PbD)

Embedding of security/privacy into the architecture (hardware+software) of various products, programs, or services.

Retrofitting: Difficult → Impossible!



Source: https://teachprivacy.com/tag/privacy-by-design/

Source: S. P. Mohanty, "Security and Privacy by Design is Key in the Internet of Everything (IoE) Era," IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 4-5, 1 March 2020, doi: 10.1109/MCE.2019.2954959.

IEE ISVLSI 2023 - iTPM

Security by Design (SbD)-Principles

Principles

Fundamental



Proactive not Reactive

Security/Privacy as the Default

Security/Privacy Embedded into Design

Full Functionality - Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum


End-to-End Security/Privacy - Lifecycle Protection

Visibility and Transparency

Respect for Users



CPS – loT-Edge Vs loT-Cloud



End Security/Intelligence

- ➤ Minimal Data
- ➤ Minimal Computational Resource
- ➤ Least Accurate Data Analytics
- ➤ Very Rapid Response

Edge Security/Intelligence

- **≻Less Data**
- ➤ Less Computational Resource
- ➤ Less Accurate Data Analytics
- ➤ Rapid Response

Cloud Security/Intelligence

➤ Big Data


Internet

- ➤ Lots of Computational Resource
- ➤ Accurate Data Analytics
- ➤ Latency in Network
- ➤ Energy Overhead in Communications



Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)

PUF: A Hardware-Assisted Security Primitive



- A secure fingerprint generation scheme based on process variations in an Integrated Circuit
- •PUFs don't store keys in digital memory, rather derive a key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware; thus secure.
- A simple design that generates cryptographically secure keys for the device authentication




PUF: A Hardware-Assisted Security Primitive

- ✓ PUF has a Challenge as an Input and Response as an Output
- ✓ Response output from the PUF design will be unique for the challenge input on that PUF design
- ✓ Arbiter and Ring Oscillator PUFs are the most widely used PUF designs for IoT applications
- ✓ Delay-based PUF designs support the higher number of Challenge-Response pairs (CRP)




PUF Key Generation and Working




Source: International Symposium on Smart Electronics Systems (iSES) 2019 Demo (PUFchain: Hardware-Integrated Scalable Blockchain)



PUF Designs





Source: iSES 2019 Demo (PMsec: PUF-Based Energy-Efficient Authentication of Devices in the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT))



Trusted Platform Module (TPM)



Trusted Platform Module-Overview

- A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware security primitive introduced by the Trust Computing Group (TCG), which provides the root of trust for the computing platform as a simple System-On-Chip (Soc).
- A TPM is a secure cryptoprocessor being used in all advanced computing systems
- TPM Non-Volatile Memory (NVRAM) can seal and unseal the secret keys generated inside or outside TPM.






Functionality of TPM

- A TPM is composed of a cryptographic sub-system and two memories, one non-volatile and one volatile. The Endorsement Key (EK) is an RSA key with a 2048-bit length, stored at the non-volatile memory and created by the TPM manufacturer to be able to identify this unique chip.
- A specified NV-index is defined for secure storage and retrieval of private keys. Access to TPM NVRAM can be user-defined and password-protected, following TCG's procedures.

 The system configuration parameters during the boot process are stored in the TPM's Platform Configuration registers (PCR).




Source: M. Calvo and M. Beltrán, "Remote Attestation as a Service for Edge-Enabled IoT," 2021 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), Chicago, IL, USA, 2021, pp. 329-339, doi: 10.1109/SCC53864.2021.00046.



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
Applications of TPM






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PUF versus TPM





- The set of specifications for a secure crypto-processor and
- 2) The implementation of these specifications on a chip



Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF)

Source: Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

PUF:


- 1) Based on a physical system
- 2) Generates random output values



Our First Novel Integration PUF with TPM in DLT Security-by-Design of IoT

PUFchain 4.0: Integrating PUF-based TPM in Distributed Ledger for Security-by-Design of IoT


Architectural Overview of PUFchain 4.0






Architecture of Proposed PUF-based TPM

Conventional TPM Architecture




PUF-based TPM Architecture






Working Overview of PUFchain 4.0





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PUFchain 4.0:Enrollment and Authentication






Implementation and Validation

Sealing and unsealing PUF Key inside TPM by accessing NVRAM

```
pi@raspberrypi: - $ tpm2 nvwrite 0x1500020 -C o -i nv.dat
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ tpm2_nvread 0x1500020 -C o
i@raspberrypi:~ $ tpm2_nvwrite 0x1500021 -C o -i nv.dat
pi@raspberrypi: - $ tpm2_nvread 0x1500021 -C o
                            → 1<sup>st</sup> Edge Node PUF Key in TPM
pi@raspberrypi: - 5 tpm2 nvwrite 0x1500020 -C o -i nv.dat
i@raspberrypi:~ $ tpm2_nvread 0x1500020 -C o
pi@raspberrypi: S tpm2_nvwrite 0x1500021 -C o -i nv.dat
                           2nd Edge Node PUF Key in TPM
pi@raspberrypi: S tpm2 nvread 0x1500021 -C o
oi@raspberrypi:~ $ tpm2_nvread 0x1500020 -C o
pi@raspberrypi:- $
```

Authentication and Transaction verification outputs on IOTA Explorer

Streams v0 Channel





Performance Analysis of PUFchain 4.0

Characterization

Parameters	Results	
Application	IoT	
Hardware Security Module	TPM, PUF	
Hardware Security Mechanism	PUF-based Hardware TPM	
TPM Board Specification	Infineon Optiga™ SLB 9670 TPM	
	2.0	
TPM Storage	NVRAM	
Free NV memory	6962 Bytes	
Data Security System	Tangle	
Communication Protocol	Masked Authentication Messaging	
TPM module	Geek Pi TPM 2.0	
PUF Module	Arbiter PUF	
PUF Key	64 Bit	


Performance Analysis

Parameters	Results	
NV Storage capacity (Read/Write)	768 Bytes	
Time to generate PUF key	87 ms	
Power Consumption of pi with TPM	2.7-3.3 Watt	
Time to perform device authentication	2000 ms	
PUF Metrics	Reliability- 99%	
Time to write PUF key to TPM	real-299 ms, user-12 ms, and sys-19 ms	
Time to read PUF key from TPM	real-411 ms, user-22 ms, and sys-10 ms	

Continued...

Streams vO Channel

Working Prototype



Transaction verification of outputs on IOTA Explorer


General						
Root	JBLTQEGMBNEBWQPUNPYTTYJOWZJILVAVJGEYOAJ9BZFBOTXJMFXNYVFLSOSFCRGNESKGFKPGSRNFXWARP					
Mode	Public Private Redricted					
Side Key	MYKEY					
	Find Date Stop					
Root JBLTQEGMBNEBWQPUNPYTTYJ	OWZJILVAVJGEYOAJ9BZFBOTXJMFXNYVFLSOSFCRGNESKGFKPGSRNFXWARP					
Tag MY9MAM						
Message ascii						
1']						
	PUF Key 19199111191991111919911119199111191991111					
	TPM NV-Index for Node 1					
Root	Root					
	IKXBZZT9B9PUX9RILXXPGO9RT9FWHSJTPBHRC9ZPPOZHLFPSRPVHEUYHYRMQEOWJGZKOMOOIVUYTBMLCY					
Tag MY9MAM	Tag MY9MAM					
Message ascii						
Node output: ['1676447	285.0460067' '0x1500021' 'dc:a6:32:c8:d7:50' '11010010110100101101001011010010110100101					
PUF Key						
Authentication is successful TPM NV-Index for Node 2						
0x1500021						

Our Novel Integration PUF with TPM using PCR: Security-by-Design of IoT

iTPM: Exploring PUF-based Keyless TPM for Security-by-Design of Smart Electronics



Overview of Proposed iTPM




- The proposed SbD primitive works by performing secure verification of the PUF key using TPM's Encryption and Decryption engine. The securely verified PUF Key is then bound to TPM using Platform Configuration Registers (PCR).
- By binding PUF with PCR in TPM, a novel PUF-based access control. The policy can be defined, as bringing in a new security ecosystem for the emerging Internet-of-Everything era.



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Working Flow of Proposed iTPM





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Novel Contributions

- A sustainable PUF-based TPM SbD approach that works by defining a PUF-based access control policy for TPM.
- A simple, lightweight, and robust approach for integrating two hardware security primitives
 PUF, and TPM to achieve the objective of sustainable and secure IoT
- A robust TPM-based PUF key verification scheme that utilizes TPM's encryption and decryption policy.
- A sustainable policy that can bind PUF with TPMs Platform Configuration Registers (PCR).
- A simple Edge computing drive PUF-based keyless TPM initiative that works by binding PUF with PCR that can facilitate a secure boot process, remote attestation, and NVRAM a
- A novel approach that explores the true potential of proposed SbD by integrating various PUF topologies with Hardware TPM.




Related Research Overview


Research Works	Applications	Security Mechanism	Features	Approach
eTPM [18]	Cloud Computing	Software TPM	Virtual Machine(VM) Security	Cloud Computing
RADIS [19]	loT	NA	Distributed Service Attestation	Distributed
xTSeH [4]	IoMT (Device)	Hardware TPM	TPM based Service Attestation	Decentralized
TPM-based Sensor Security [20]	Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)	Hardware TPM	Secure WSN	NA
IoT Remote Attestation [14]	loT	Raspberry pi based TPM, Blockchain	Malware Detection	NA
PUFchain 4.0 [12]	loT (Device & Data)	PUF, Hardware TPM, Tangle	Sealing PUF key inside TPM (NVRAM)	Edge Computing
iTPM	Smart Electronics	PUF, Hardware TPM	Securely Binding PUF with PCR	Edge Computing

PUF Topologies

Arbiter PUF


XOR Arbiter PUF





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
PUF Metrics



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Prototype and Validation

Prototype



Validation


Metrics	Results		
Application	Smart Electronics		
Hardware Security Mechanism	PUF-based Keyless TPM		
Security Modules	TPM, PUF		
PUF Modules	XOR Arbiter & Arbiter PUF		
Approach	Integrating PUF with TPM's PCR		
Platform Configuration Registers	16 & 23		
TPM Integration	Encryption & Decryption Engine, and PCR		
TPM	Hardware TPM		
Hardware TPM Chip	Infineon SLB 9670		
PUF	Xc7a35tcpg236-1		
TPM Embedded Device	Single Board Computer		
Interface	SPI, UART		
Tools	tpm2-tools, tpm2-abrmd, VIVADO 2020.2		
TPM Hash Algorithm	Sha-1 and Sha 256		
Possible Applications	Remote Attestation, and Secure Boot Process		




Experimental Results

```
>>> %Run PUF based Keyless TPM Server.py
 ['1680948954.2487712' 'dc:a6:32:c8:d7:50' '100110001001100100110010010011000100110001001100010011000100110001001
 1001100010011000100110001001100010011000100110001001100010011000
 Received Arbiter PUF Key
                                                     Validating Arbiter PUF
 Device Authentication Successful
 Time taken to validate PUF
 1.1611261367797852
>>> %Run 'PUF_based_Keyless_TPM Server(2).py
Enrolled XOR Arbiter PUF Key
0010001100100011001000110010001100100011001000110010001100100011
Received XOR Arbiter PUF Key
Validating XOR PUF
Device Authentication Successful
Time taken to validate PUF
2.2444186218632324
```

(a) Arbiter & XOR PUF validation



(b) TPM Encryption and Decryption



(c) Binding PUF inside Platform Configuration Registers



Summary

- This paper presented and validated a novel SbD approach with a sustainable policy for integrating PUF and TPM by binding PUF with PCRs inside TPM.
- By successfully binding PUF in PCR, the PUF is made as a device integrity credential required for a secure boot process.
- Further, the experimental analysis revealed that integrating PUF inside PCR could bind PUF with TPM and facilitate security at the edge level in smart Electronics applications.
- The proposed approach also presents the possibility of PUF-enabled secure firmware and boot processes for computing systems
- By Integrating the PUF with TPM in this work, we validated the potential of PUF-based TPM security solutions for IoT.



Future Research

- Idea of implementing PUF-based TPM scheme for the Security-by-Design (SbD) in Smart Healthcare.
- Exploring the feasibility of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) integrated scalable Blockchain-based cryptographic scheme to attain the Security by Design (SbD) objective in IoMT.
- Working on an integrated access control mechanism for resource-constrained electronic devices using TPM
- Developing scalable and sustainable TPM-enabled IoT device authentication scheme for Fog, Edge, and Cloud Computing Paradigms.
- Extending iTPM scheme for the resource-constrained IoMT and Internet of Agro-Things security.



Thank You!!

